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Abstract
This paper assesses the degree of wage flexibility in Luxembourg using an 
administrative data set on individual base wages covering the entire economy over the 
period 2001-2006 with monthly frequency. We find that the wage flexibility at the 
discretion of the firm is rather low once we limit measurement error and remove wage 
changes due to institutional factors (indexation, changes in statutory minimum wage, 
age and marital status). The so adjusted frequency of wage change lies between 5% 
and 7%. On average, wages change less often than consumer prices. Less than one 
percent of (nominal) wages are cut both from month to month and from year to year. 
Due to automatic wage indexation, wages appear to be subject to substantial downward 
real wage rigidity. Finally, wage changes tend to be highly synchronised as they are 
concentrated around the events of wage indexation and the month of January. 
Keywords: wage flexibility, wage rigidity. 
JEL Classification: J31 5
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Non-technical summary
Nominal rigidities are a mainstay of the New Keynesian literature. Whether
wages or prices are ﬂexible or rigid bears important implications for monetary
policy as “temporary nominal rigidities provide key friction that gives rise to
nonneutral eﬀects of monetary policy.” (Clarida et al. (1999)). Measures of
wage rigidity appear to have important implications for the degree of inﬂation
persistence and the optimal monetary policy. While many recent macroeco-
nomic models incorporate wage and price rigidities and rely on some measure
of price and wage stickiness in their calibration, such as the frequency of price
and wage change or the duration of nominal contracts, until recently, little was
known about the strength of these rigidities in European countries. Over the
recent past a comprehensive literature has emerged assessing the stickiness of
prices based on individual quotes of consumer and producer prices. So far, em-
pirical evidence on the rigidity of wages remains scarce, although wage rigidities
might be a source of price stickiness and are often considered the main reason for
higher structural unemployment in Europe compared to the US. Moreover, wage
rigidity restricts adjustment to shocks within a currency union and interferes
with eﬃcient allocation of resources.
The aim of this paper is to assess the degree of wage ﬂexibility in Luxembourg
using a unique administrative dataset with information on individual earnings.
The administrative dataset has monthly frequency and covers all ﬁrms and
employees in Luxembourg between January 2001 and December 2006. We focus
on the ﬂexibility of base wages referring to individual occupations (i.e. unique
employer-employee relationships). Throughout the analysis, the degree of wage
ﬂexibility is measured as the frequency of wage change. In order to assess
more speciﬁcally the degree of downward wage ﬂexibility we distinguish between
wage increases and wage cuts. In contrast to the vast majority of the existing
research, the very wide coverage and the high frequency of the database provide
a representative measure of wage ﬂexibility covering nearly all sectors of the
economy, all ﬁrm-size classes and all types of employees over a period as long as
six years. In addition, the paper illustrates how measurement error (e.g. due to
lack of explicit information on overtime hours and compensation) can lead to
implausibly frequent wage adjustment. We provide estimates of the frequency
of wage change based on two alternative approaches to limit measurement error.
One of the approaches deﬁnes a set of judgmental rules to eliminate supposedly
implausible patterns of wage adjustment. The other approach is based on the
assumption that measurement error free wage trajectory is a step function and
identiﬁes true wage changes as structural breaks in the individual base wage
series. Finally, we provide estimates of wage ﬂexibility at the discretion of
a ﬁrm by adjusting the frequency of wage change by a set of institutionally
determined wage changes (such as changes due to statutory wage indexation).
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, measurement error
in the reported number of hours worked can substantially bias the estimated
frequency of wage change upwards. In the raw dataset we obtain an average
monthly frequency of wage change of approximately 57%. However, after limit-
ing measurement error, the remaining frequency of wage change is between 9%
and 14%. The resulting wage change frequency is thus lower than the consumer
price change frequency in Luxembourg (17%) and the average frequency of pro-
ducer price change in six euro area countries other than Luxembourg (21%).6
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Second, we ﬁnd a substantial degree of heterogeneity across ﬁrms of dif-
ferent size, between public and private ﬁrms, across sectors of the economy,
occupational groups and between diﬀerent periods. Blue-collar workers reveal
the lowest frequency of wage change, while civil servants exhibit the highest
frequency. While wages of civil servants change more often, they change by the
smallest amount at the same time. The same reasoning explains why public sec-
tor enterprises have higher frequency of wage change than private enterprises.
Our results also suggest that larger ﬁrms tend to change wages more often.
Third, we ﬁnd that wage changes tend to be highly synchronised as they
are concentrated around months of wage indexation and the month of January.
In a typical year, approximately 50% of all wage changes occur in the event of
indexation and another one quarter of wage changes is observed in the month of
January, reﬂecting the predominant share of collective wage agreements entering
into eﬀect in this month. Nearly all wages change during indexation events.
Our results suggest that the overall frequency of wage change is substantially
driven by institutional factors which are not at the discretion of the ﬁrm. If we
adjust for institutionally determined wage changes (i.e. wage changes due to
indexation, changes in statutory minimum wage or changes in age and marital
status), the remaining monthly wage change frequency is between 5% and 7%.
This suggests that the measured frequency of wage adjustment may overstate
the extent of wage ﬂexibility at the discretion of the ﬁrm.
Finally, the evidence presented in the paper suggests that wages in Luxem-
bourg are subject to substantial downward wage rigidity, both in nominal terms
and in real terms. We ﬁnd that less than one percent of (nominal) wages are cut
both from month to month and from year to year. Moreover, only few wages
are cut in real terms, i.e. either the nominal wage decreases or it grows by less
than the inﬂation rate stipulated by the automatic wage indexation mechanism
(i.e. 2.5%). The vast majority of wages in Luxembourg increase by this rate in
the event of indexation.7
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we assess the degree of wage ﬂexibility in Luxembourg using
monthly data on base wages referring to individual occupations (i.e. unique
employer-employee relationships) over the period 2001 to 2006. Whether wages
are ﬂexible or rigid remains a controversial question that enters many theoreti-
cal and policy discussions. From the theoretical point of view, the assumption
of rigid nominal adjustment is a distinctive feature of the New Keynesian liter-
ature. As Clarida et al. (1999) state, “the approach [..] is based on the idea that
temporary nominal rigidities provide key friction that gives rise to nonneutral
eﬀects of monetary policy.” Many recent macroeconomic models incorporate
wage and price rigidities and rely on some measure of price and wage stickiness
in their calibration, such as the frequency of price and wage change or the dura-
tion of nominal contracts. Measures of wage rigidity appear to have important
implications for the degree of inﬂation persistence and the optimal monetary
policy (e.g. Blanchard and Galí (2007)).
The Eurosystem Inﬂation Persistence research Network (IPN) concluded
that wage rigidity can be a cause of price stickiness observed in the euro area.
Numerous papers document that prices change less frequently for products with
a larger labour share, like services (Altissimo et al. (2006); Alvarez et al. (2005);
Dhyne et al. (2005); Vermeulen et al. (2007)). It was suggested that this may
be due to sluggish marginal costs, in particular rigid wages.
This paper is also related to the policy debate concerning wage rigidity.
Wage rigidity is often considered a primary cause of higher unemployment rates
in Europe, as compared to the US (Jackman et al. (1999)). The argument sug-
gests that labour market rigidities, such as minimum wages, collective agree-
ments etc., prevent companies from cutting wages. Furthermore, wage rigidity
restricts adjustment to shocks within a currency union and interferes with eﬃ-
cient allocation of resources.
We assess the degree of wage stickiness using a set of broad-based measures
based on a unique microeconomic high-frequency administrative dataset. This
study extends the empirical literature in several ways. First, most of the mi-
croeconomic evidence on wage adjustment is based on an analysis of annual
earnings (e.g. Fehr and Goette (2005)) or quarterly wage data (e.g. Heckel
et al. (2008)), while we study wage adjustment at monthly frequency. Second,
we consider actual wage adjustments at the employer-employee level, rather
than analysing data on collective wage agreements (see, for example, Cecchetti
(1987)) or referring to a small number of representative employees (e.g. Heckel
et al. (2008), Birscoup et al. (2005)). Third, in contrast to studies of speciﬁc
labour markets (Akerlof et al. (1996)) or individual ﬁrms (Altonji and Devreux
(2000)), we provide a representative measure of wage ﬂexibility covering nearly
all sectors of the economy, all ﬁrm-size classes and all types of employees over
a period as long as six years. Fourth, we provide estimates of the frequency of
wage change based on two alternative approaches to limit measurement error
and illustrate how measurement errors can lead to implausibly frequent wage
adjustment. Fifth, by adjusting the total frequency of wage change by a set
of institutional wage changes (such as due to statutory wage indexation), we
provide estimates of wage ﬂexibility at the discretion of the ﬁrm.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Measurement error in the
reported hours worked can substantially bias the estimated frequency of wage8
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change upwards. In the raw dataset we obtain an average monthly frequency of
wage change of approximately 57 percent. However, after limiting measurement
error, the remaining frequency of wage change is between 9% and 14%. The
resulting wage change frequency is thus lower than the consumer price change
frequency in Luxembourg (17% reported by Lünnemann and Mathä (2005))
and the average frequency of producer price change in six euro area countries
excluding Luxembourg (21% reported by Vermeulen et al. (2007)).
In addition, we ﬁnd a substantial degree of heterogeneity across ﬁrms of
diﬀerent size, between public and private ﬁrms, across sectors of the economy,
occupational groups and diﬀerent periods. Blue-collar workers reveal the low-
est frequency of wage change, while civil servants exhibit the highest frequency.
The same reasoning explains why public sector enterprises have higher frequency
of wage change than private enterprises. While wages of civil servants change
more often, they change by the smallest amount at the same time. Our results
also suggest that larger ﬁrms tend to change wages more often. Moreover, wage
changes tend to be highly synchronised as they are concentrated around months
of wage indexation and the month of January. In a typical year, approximately
50% of all wage changes occur in the event of indexation and another one quar-
ter of wage changes is observed in January, reﬂecting the predominant share of
collective wage agreements entering into eﬀect in this month. Nearly all wages
change during indexation events. Our results suggest that the overall frequency
of wage change is substantially driven by institutional wage changes which are
not at the discretion of the ﬁrm. If we remove the eﬀects of institutional wage
changes (i.e. wage changes due to indexation, to changes in statutory minimum
wage and to changes in age and marital status), the remaining monthly wage
change frequency is at most 7 percent. This suggests that the measured fre-
quency of wage adjustment may overstate the extent of wage ﬂexibility that is
really at the discretion of the ﬁrm.
Put together, the evidence presented in the paper suggest that wages in
Luxembourg are subject to substantial downward real wage rigidity (DRWR).
DRWR implies that only few wages are cut in real terms, i.e. either the nominal
wage decreases or it grows by less than the inﬂation rate stipulated by the
automatic wage indexation mechanism (i.e. 2.5%). The vast majority of wages
in Luxembourg increase by this rate in the event of indexation. We documented
that less than one percent of (nominal) wages are cut both from month to month
and from year to year.
The paper is organised in four sections. Section 2 provides a brief overview
of the macroeconomic situation in Luxembourg over the 6-year sample period
and reviews the wage bargaining process and labour market institutions. Sec-
tion 3 describes the dataset and the way we adjust for measurement error in
reported hours worked. It also formalizes our approach to the measurement of
wage stickiness. Section 4 present the results, while Section 5 concludes and
provides an outlook for further research.9
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2 Key elements of the labour market in Luxem-
bourg
To put our results on the frequency of wage adjustment into perspective, one
has to consider the speciﬁc aspects of the labour market in Luxembourg. Trade
union density in Luxembourg is relatively high compared to other western Eu-
ropean countries according to Du Caju et al. (2008). The wage bargaining
is decentralized with wage bargaining typically undertaken at the ﬁrm-level.
Coordination of wage bargaining is achieved mainly through automatic state-
imposed indexation of wages and minimum wage regulation. The coordination
mechanism has important implications for the monthly frequency of wage ad-
justment and hence we describe it in detail in the following subsections, while
other aspects of the labour market in Luxembourg are discussed in Appendix A.
2.1 The wage indexation mechanism
Explicit wage indexation schemes are imposed in a number of European coun-
tries (e.g. Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, see Du Caju
et al. (2008)). However, only in a few countries (among which Luxembourg) is
wage indexation the dominant coordination mechanism. While in most coun-
tries wage indexation applies only to a sub-set of the entire workforce (e.g. for
the public sector, as in the Czech Republic), in Luxembourg, all wages (and
pensions) are completely indexed.1 Wage indexation in Luxembourg as well as
in Belgium and Cyprus is entirely automatic.
The state-imposed wage indexation mechanism is entirely backward-looking,
with wages being indexed to past developments in the Luxembourg national in-
dex of consumer prices (NICP hereafter).2 For most of the period under study
(namely from 2001 to mid-2006), the legislation required automatic wage index-
ation to kick in whenever the 6-month moving average of the NICP increased
by 2.5% relative to its level at the time of the preceding wage indexation event.
In the event of a new round of indexation, wages were increased by 2.5% at
the beginning of the month following the breach of the 2.5% threshold. Im-
portantly, the wage indexation mechanism made no distinction with regard to
the sources of inﬂation. Regardless of the sources underlying, increases in the
general price level were fully passed through to wages in the event of wage
indexation. In 2006, the Luxembourg Government chose to deviate from this
purely mechanical implementation3 and introduced an amendment (modulation
hereafter) governing the implementation of automatic wage indexation over the
period 2006-2009. This was justiﬁed by competitiveness concerns following the
rapid increase in oil prices and lead to a lower number of wage indexation events
during 2006-2009. For 2006, the modulation excluded any further wage indexa-
tion prior to December 2006 regardless of the actual developments in the price
level. In December 2006, wages were indexed by 2.5%, i.e. a rate inferior to the
1Prior to the law of 27 May 1975, and since 1921, indexation was applied only to civil
servants and railway staﬀ (Adam and da Costa (2002)).
2Minor exceptions apply. A very small number of price changes are not taken into account
within the framework of the wage indexation mechanism.
3Similar deviations occured in the past, e.g. in the wake of the devaluation of the Belgian
and the Luxembourg Franc in 1982 (Fontagné (2004)).10
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increase in the general price level observed since the preceding event of wage
indexation (i.e. October 2005).4
Automatic wage adjustments due to indexation are exogenous to the indi-
vidual ﬁrm. However, ﬁrms can anticipate the timing and the size of wage
adjustments due to indexation.5 First, the level of the NICP (and, implicitly,
the accumulated increase in the general price level since the last indexation) is
regularly published by the national statistical institute (Statec). Second, both
Statec and the Banque centrale du Luxembourg provide inﬂation forecasts twice
a year which are available to the public at large. Third, the wage indexation
mechanism is often considered a cornerstone of the Luxembourg model,b o t hi n
politics and by the general public. Its desirability as well as the prospects for
an upcoming round of wage indexation are widely discussed within the national
press. Over the period under study, wage indexation kicked in six times.6 As
reported in Du Caju et al. (2008), in Luxembourg, wage indexation is the dom-
inant form of coordination in the economy as a whole. Whereas its impact on
wages is obvious, Lünnemann and Mathä (2006) report that ﬁrms in the ser-
vices sector consider wage indexation to be the second most important reason
for price increases.
2.2 The statutory minimum wage
In addition to the imposed mechanism of wage indexation, wage formation in
Luxembourg is subject to a legal minimum wage. This extends to all sectors of
the Luxembourg economy and the minimum wage level imposed is identical for
all sectors of the Luxembourg economy. As in other countries with a minimum
wage, a 20% (25%) reduction is applied to the wages of young workers in the
age of 17 (age of 15 and 16). For qualiﬁed workers, a 20% premium is applied.
However, in general, there is no distinction according to tenure. As reported in
Du Caju et al. (2008), the minimum wage level in Luxembourg is fairly high and
so is the proportion of workers covered by the minimum wage regime (between
10 and 20%).The minimum wage is deﬁned as an hourly rate and as a monthly
wage (the latter being derived on the basis of 173 hours worked per month). At
the end of the sample period the monthly minimum wage was EUR 1.503 (EUR
1.804) for unskilled workers (skilled workers) aged 18 or more. In the event
of an automatic wage indexation, the minimum wage is adjusted accordingly.
Importantly, changes to the minimum wage can result for reasons other than
wage indexation. Adjustments in the minimum wage unrelated to indexation
are ﬁrst negotiated within the framework of the tripartite. The Government
considers changes to the minimum wage at biannual frequency. Ultimately, any
such changes are implemented by Government on the grounds of an assessment
4The postponement of the indexation to no earlier than December 2006, as stipulated by
the led to a 14-month period of no-indexation, similar to almost all other years under study.
While the modulation has not aﬀected the rate by which wages are changed in the case of
indexation, given the fairly high inﬂation rates observed in 2006, it might have had an impact
on wage negotiations and wage setting behaviour in more general. However, the amendment
has been introduced in mid-2006 only, probably after standard collective wage agreements
had been concluded. Moreover, with an average length of collective wage agreements in
Luxembourg of roughly 2 years, only a subset of collective agreements was settled in 2006.
5This applies in particular to the period of modulation when actual inﬂation considerably
exceeded the 2.5% threshold.
6Wage indexations occured in April 2001, June 2002, August 2003, October 2004, October
2005 and December 2006.11
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of the developments in real salaries over the past two years. During the sample
period, ex-indexation adjustments to the minimum wage took eﬀect in January
2003 and in January 2005.
2.3 Other coordination mechanisms
Additional forms of coordination, other than wage-indexation and minimum
wages also apply, though they are not dominant. The most important of these
secondary coordination mechanisms is “intra-associational coordination”.7 Un-
like some countries, inter-associational coordination 8 and pattern bargaining
do not apply in Luxembourg. As already indicated, the patterns of wage ad-
justment (in particular their frequency) may also depend on the duration of
collective wage agreements. Du Caju et al. (2008) report an average duration
of collective agreements in Luxembourg of roughly two years. As in many other
countries, we observe a strong seasonal pattern in the timing of such collective
wage agreements. Wage negotiations typically start around the turn of the year
and agreements are typically reached within the ﬁrst quarter of the following
year (as in Belgium and France). However, diﬀerent seasonal patterns may ap-
ply to selected sectors. Moreover, in Industry, Market services and Non-market
services sectors, the actual timing may lag behind the above seasonal pattern
due to persistent diﬃculties in ﬁnding an agreement. Substantial delays typi-
cally lead to agreements that are applied retrospectively and/or lead to one-oﬀ
payments. Pre-expiry renegotiations are common in the Industry, Market ser-
vices and Non-market services sectors, in particular during periods of slower
growth and rising concerns about competitiveness.
3 Data, methods and variables
Hereafter, the analysis makes reference to four main samples (raw, baseline,
cleaned and adjusted dataset). The raw dataset is only used to provide aggregate
ﬁgures for the entire Luxembourg economy and, later on, to assess the impact
of measures aimed at limiting measurement error and the impact of cleaning
on size of the subsample relative to the entire population. The raw dataset
reﬂects the total Luxembourg labour market. However, it encompasses, among
others, occupations/observations with partly missing information (e.g. Nace
code, ﬁrm ID, etc.), which is needed to derive estimates of frequencies of wage
change or disaggregated results (e.g. sectoral results). The baseline dataset
includes all observations that can be used to compute measures of frequency of
wage change without addressing measurement error. This baseline dataset is
therefore the broadest one for which meaningful frequencies can be obtained.
Measures of the frequency of wage change based on this dataset are thus not
aﬀected by any of the methods used later on to limit measurement error or
to adjust for institutional wage changes.9 The cleaned dataset is obtained by
adjusting the baseline dataset for (supposedly) implausible observations or wage
7Intra-associational coordination refers to wage bargaining undertaken at the level of um-
brella organisations of either employers or trade unions. Du Caju et al. (2008) cite intra-
associational coordination dominant for the majority of the countries studied.
8Inter-associational coordination is meant to characterize wage bargaining determined at
the national level or by means of cross-sectoral agreements, see Du Caju et al. (2008).
9The baseline dataset had to be slightly modiﬁed in order to derive estimates of wage
ﬂexibility based on the multiple break point test (see Section 3.1 and C.2).12
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trajectories based on judgemental rules. Finally, the adjusted dataset attempts
to approximate the true degree of wage ﬂexibility at the discretion of a ﬁrm.
For this reason we adjust the cleaned dataset for the eﬀects of wage indexation,
changes of statutory minimum wage, age and marital status.
3.1 Baseline dataset
The analysis is based on micro data from the Luxembourg social security au-
thority (Inspection G´ en´ erale de la S´ ecurit´ e Sociale, IGSS hereafter). The data
is that reported by employers to the social security institutions on behalf of all
their aﬃliated employees. The data is organised at monthly frequency and cov-
ers the period from January 2001–December 2006.10 The raw dataset includes
more than 21 million observations reporting individual wage data for almost
475 000 employees aﬃliated with more than 45 000 employers covering more
than 830 000 occupations. In 2006, the aggregate volume of salaries covered by
the dataset (i.e. more than 12.5 bn EUR) corresponded to an amount equivalent
to approximately 37% of nominal GDP.
For any given unique relationship between an employee i and an employer j
in month t, the data base provides the following type of information:
1. Information related to the employee, such as date of birth, gender, marital
status, nationality, country and place of residence, date of ﬁrst aﬃliation
with the Luxembourg social security system;
2. Information related to the employer, such as the location and sector (ac-
cording to two-digit NACE rev. 1.1)a n d
3. Information related to the occupation itself, such as the base salary, bonuses
granted, contributions to social security (paid by employer and employee),
start date, occupational group11, the number of hours worked, etc. Our
key indicator of interest in the analysis of wage ﬂexibility is the base
salary12
In addition, there is complementary information implicit in the database
related to the employee (the number of occupations maintained) or to the em-
ployer (the total number of staﬀ, public institution versus private enterprise).
Due to missing or inappropriate information, estimates of the frequencies of
wage change cannot be obtained at the level of the raw dataset. For analytical
purposes, we remove observations that either cannot be used (e.g. due to missing
information) or are of limited use for the analysis which focuses on representative
types of employment. Most importantly, we remove observations with extremely
high/low number of hours worked, occupations lasting less than 6 consecutive
months and ﬁrms that existed for less than 36 months, the household sector, the
10Strictly speaking, the database includes retired persons, pre-retired, jobless, freelancers,
etc. However, the following analysis is restricted to regularly employed people only. On the
other hand, the data does not provide information on oﬃcials aﬃliated with the local EU
institutions, such as the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Auditors, the
European Commission, the European Investment Bank.
11Throughout the analysis, and based on the information available from the database, we
distinguish between three types of occupational groups, namely blue-collar workers, white-
collar employees and civil servants
12On the issue of measurement error see also Section 3.2 below.13
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last month of each occupation and some other peculiar observations. Speciﬁc
details on the reasons for removing such observation and their impact on the
size and representativeness of the dataset are discussed in Appendix B.1.
After applying these restrictions, the dataset (baseline dataset hereafter)
contains more than 17.3 million wage observations, representing more than
437 000 occupations maintained between more than 16 000 ﬁrms and more than
350 000 employees. The data cleaning thus yields a substantial reduction in the
number of ﬁrms (roughly -65%), employees (-26%) and observations (-20%).
The sharp reduction in the number of ﬁrms considered is largely due to the
exclusion of NACE sector P Activities of households, the household sector being
the largest sector of the Luxembourg economy in terms of number of “ﬁrms”.
The impact on the total volume of base wage bill earned is less sizeable (-9.4%).
The baseline dataset includes only observations that can be used to compute
measures of frequency of wage change, without any further measures to limit
measurement error. The baseline dataset is therefore the broadest one for which
frequencies can be derived. Measures of the frequency of wage change based on
the baseline dataset are thus not aﬀected by any of the methods used later on
to limit measurement error or to adjust for institutional wage adjustments.13
3.2 Cleaned dataset
There may be several reasons why the measured frequency of wage change is a
poor indicator of true wage ﬂexibility. First, this may result from misreported
data, i.e. wages earned and/or hours worked. Indeed, studies of individual
ﬁrms are less prone to measurement error and typically ﬁnd much fewer cases of
nominal wage cuts than studies based on survey data (see Altonji and Devreux
(2000)). Second, an upward bias in the measured frequency of wage change may
result from incomplete information available to the researcher. For example, our
database lacks explicit information on overtime hours and overtime remunera-
tion. Variation in the number of overtime hours may lead not only to changes
in the monthly salary for hourly workers, but also to a diﬀerent average hourly
wage rate when such overtime hours are remunerated at rates other than those
applied to normal work hours (e.g. Sundays, night work).14
Below we list the rules that we implemented in order to ﬁlter out such ob-
servations (in case of blue-collar workers) or trajectories (in case of white-collar
workers) from the baseline dataset.15 Further details on the rules are provided
13The baseline dataset had to be slightly modiﬁed in order to derive estimates of wage
ﬂexibility based on the multiple break point test (rather than based on explicit judgemental
rules). The reasons are twofold. First, the multiple break point test appears to be sensitive
to very large wage changes that are most likely outliers and hence we removed 2.5 percent
of the largest wage changes. Second, given the limited number of potential break points for
which critical values are reported by Bai and Perron (1998), we decided to adjust the baseline
dataset by known wage changes (institutional reasons, in particular due to wage indexation
and adjustments to the minimum wage.
14Similarly, changes in the monthly salary and the average hourly wage rate may result if
the total base wage consists of a ﬁxed and a variable component.
15We apply distinct rules to blue-collar workers on the one hand and white-collar employees
and civil servants on the other hand. Assuming that white-collar employees and civil servants
are typically remunerated according to a monthly salary with relatively infrequent changes
in the number of hours worked, the presence of overtime hours/compensation leads to the
exclusion of the entire wage trajectory. Applying an identical rule to blue-collar workers, who14
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in Appendix B.2 and their impact on the sample size is listed in Table 17.
1. We remove trajectories (in case of white-collar workers and civil servants)
or observations (in case of blue-collar workers) which do not fulﬁl the
requirements used to identify well-behaved trajectories of hours worked
(on the deﬁnition of well-behaved trajectories of hours worked see item 1
of Appendix B.2.)
2. We remove trajectories (in case of white-collar workers and civil servants)
or observations (in case of blue-collar workers) consisting of four consecu-
tive wage changes. Given the substantial obstacles with regard to frequent
wage changes typically reported in ﬁrm surveys (see, for example, Druant
et al. (2008)), we consider four consecutive wage changes an indication of
(unreported) changes in the number of hours worked and/or shift assign-
ments.
3. We require, for each round of indexation, the minimum wage reported
after indexation to be higher than the minimum wage reported before the
indexation. Wage trajectories not obeying this requirement are removed.16
4. We disregard wage changes which lead to a monthly salary or hourly rate
equivalent to former wage levels within a period shorter than six months.
Such wage change reversals can reﬂect a series of oﬀsetting changes or,
alternatively, two wage changes of same magnitude but diﬀerent sign.
5. The frequency of wage change should not depend on the size of wage
changes, but from an economic point of view, the role of wage changes
may well depend on their size. Tiny wage changes in terms of few euro
cents are probably not evidence of underlying wage ﬂexibility. By con-
trast, huge wage changes (say doubling the base wage) tend to be fairly
exceptional and/or suggest poor data quality, in particular when reverted
shortly afterwards. Whenever the hourly wage rate (in absolute terms)
changes by less than 0.25% and/or less than 0.075 EUR, we consider this a
no-change. Observations implying a reduction of/ an increase in the base
wage by more than 25% are also omitted.
6. In addition to disconsidering selected observations (huge wage changes)
and replacing selected others (tiny wage changes or reverting wage changes),
we eliminate wage trajectories characterised by frequent tiny and/or huge
wage changes and by numerous replacements (e.g. due to reversion to
former wage level). This is to avoid an estimate of wage change frequency
primarily based on adjustments/replacements. In order for the entire wage
trajectory to be removed (rather than a single observation from this tra-
jectory), we require the number of adjustments/replacements to represent
more than one half of all observations in the trajectory.
7. In the case of employees and civil servants, we remove observations that
report a decrease in base wage in December together with a bonus. In
are typically remunerated according to an hourly wage rate and characterised by relatively
frequent changes in the number of hours worked, would inevitably lead to an extreme loss of
observations. In the case of blue-collar workers, thus, we decide to eliminate but observations
aﬀected by overtime hours/compensation.
16Note that we do not impose downward nominal rigidity in a strict sense.15
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these cases, the base wage in January either continues at its November
level or is increased. In such cases, we omit the December observation
(i.e. split the trajectory).
8. Sometimes wage changes are entirely reversed by the following wage change.
These exact wage reversions are probably associated with misreported
overtime hours, misreported one-oﬀ payments, etc. For this reason, in
the case of white-collar employees and civil servants, we drop all wage
trajectories revealing at least one exact wage reversion (regardless of the
duration after which a wage change is reverted).
9. We remove wage trajectories with less than 12 potential wage changes (i.e.
minimum length of 13 months per trajectory).
10. Observations related to occupations between employers and workers within
NACE sector N Health and social work and observations maintained with
Governmentoperated postal services. Both the monthly salary and the
hourly wage tend to be very volatile. The high degree of volatility is likely
to result from changes in the composition of the hours worked (e.g. hours
worked on Sundays are remunerated at a premium) rather than a result
of underlying wage ﬂexibility.
In total, the remaining dataset (cleaned dataset hereafter) retains over 4.1
million wages reported covering more than 88 000 employees aﬃliated with
more than 10 000 employers. Overall, the above measures lead therefore to a
substantial reduction in the number of ﬁrms (-32%), of employees (-75%) and of
observations (-76%) relative to the baseline dataset. The cleaned dataset covers
approximately 27% of the raw dataset in terms of the volume of base wages.17
The cleaned dataset provides estimates of the frequency of wage change based
on judgemental rules.18
3.3 Adjusted dataset
If we abstract from measurement error, the remaining genuine wage changes
do not necessarily reﬂect true wage ﬂexibility. Instead, wage changes may be
entirely due to institutional factors, such as automatic wage indexation. From
the perspective of a single ﬁrm, such purely institutional/administered wage
changes might even be considered an obstacle to wage ﬂexibility. More speciﬁ-
cally, we adjust the cleaned dataset for the eﬀects of wage indexation, changes of
statutory minimum wage, age and marital status. Of course, wages may change
for reasons including other institutional elements (at the level of a single ﬁrm at
least) which we cannot identify based on the information in the dataset (such as
collective wage agreements). The resulting adjusted frequency of wage change,
therefore, is still an upper bound on the ﬂexibility at the discretion of the ﬁrm.
As already mentioned in Section 2.1, ﬁrms in Luxembourg are legally obliged
to increase base salaries by 2.5% whenever the wage mechanism is triggered. The
17On the distribution of occupations, ﬁrms and total wages across NACE sectors, see Sec-
tion B.3 in the Appendix. Our attempts to limit measurement error have a disproportionately
larger impact on the number of blue-collar workers.
18It is not used when deriving estimates of the frequency of wage change based on the
multiple break test. Rather, the multiple break point test – which serves as an alternative to
the judgemental rules – is applied to the baseline dataset.16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1074
July 2009
sample period under study is characterised by six wage indexation events which
may substantially add to the measured frequency of wage change.19 Given that
wage changes due to wage indexation are a poor proxy for the degree of wage
ﬂexibility at the discretion of the ﬁrm, we adjust the measured frequency of
wage change by removing wage changes due to indexation. In order to allow
for wage changes coinciding with wage indexation but for reasons other than
indexation, we lower the observed size of wage change by the standard 2.5%.20
Changes in the minimum wage are another institutional factor leading to
wage changes. Adjustments in the minimum wage mainly result from two fac-
tors, namely wage indexation and adjustments in line with the general rise in
wages (other than the statutory minimum wage). Overall, the impact of adjust-
ments in the minimum wage for reasons other than wage indexation is expected
to be much smaller than in the case of indexation because changes in the min-
imum wage for reasons other than wage indexation apply directly only to a
subset of employees and appear only twice during the sample period. The size
and the timing of these adjustments in the minimum wage and apply to all
occupations remunerated at the minimum wage. We allow for other simulta-
neous wage adjustments (beyond those due to minimum wage adjustments) by
lowering the observed wage change by the stipulated increase in the minimum
wage in January 2003 (3.5%) and January 2005 (2.1%).
Depending on the institutional arrangements governing the level and the
dynamics of wages across sectors and occupational groups, wage changes may
result from changes in age and/or marital status.21 Unlike automatic wage
indexation, the impact of a change in the age and/or the marital status on the
wage level is not unique, but varies depending on the sector of the company
and/or the occupational group. Moreover, the size of the wage change due to a
change in age and/or marital status cannot be determined from the information
available. Therefore, we decide not to adjust the size of wage adjustment but
rather to eliminate all wage changes reported in the event of a change in age
and/or marital status of employees (i.e. the trajectory is split).
3.4 Methods and variables
3.4.1 Deﬁning wage
Even though the database does include information about the status of the em-
ployee (blue-collar/white-collar worker/civil servant), it remains unclear whether
the person is a salaried employee or an hourly worker. By default we assume that
white-collar workers and civil servants are salaried and blue-collar workers are
compensated per hour. We distinguish the two situations by testing whether the
hourly wage or monthly salary appear to be indexed (i.e. are increased precisely
by 2.5% in the indexation periods). We did not ﬁnd any white-collar worker or
civil servant whose hourly wage appeared to be indexed (without having their
salary indexed at the same time). On the other hand, several blue-collar workers
19With no wage changes other than indexation, wage indexation would imply a frequency
of more than eight percent for a person observed during the entire sample period.
20Depending on the degree to which wages are indexed, this adjustment can lead to lower
or higher frequency of wage change.
21For similar, institutional reasons, salary increases may result in the event of birth of a
child. However, as we have no information on the number of children, we cannot adjust for
such changes.17
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had their monthly salaries indexed, while their hourly earnings did not appear
to be indexed. In such situations we calculate the frequency of changes in the
monthly salary excluding bonuses divided by normal working hours, rather than
analysing the hourly base wage.
We base our calculation of the frequency of wage change on the following
measure of base wage. For hourly workers (most of the blue-collar workers,
as deﬁned above) we divide the monthly base wage by the reported number
of hours. For salaried workers (white-collar workers, civil servants and some
blue-collar workers), we divide the monthly base wage by the constant normal
hours worked corresponding to the particular part-time/full-time proﬁle (e.g.
173 hours for all full-time workers).
3.4.2 Frequency of wage adjustment
In analogy to the recent literature studying micro price stickiness,22 we study
the degree of wage rigidity based on the analysis of trajectories of base wages
(referred to as wages hereafter) reported for individual occupations. A wage
trajectory is deﬁned below as a sequence of wage records characterising a single
occupation over time. A wage trajectory can be divided into one or more wage
spells, i.e. periods of constant wages for any given employee-employer relation-
ship. As in the micro price studies (see, for example, Alvarez et al. (2005) and
Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004)), we present evidence on the frequency of wage
changes and the size of such wage changes. Given the importance of downward
wage rigidity, throughout the analysis we distinguish between wage reductions
and wage increases. Let w
ij
t denote the wage paid to employee i aﬃliated with
ﬁrm j in period t. The frequency of wage change is the number of actual wage
changes divided by the number of potential wage changes. All observations are
potential wage changes except for those with missing information on the wage
level in period t−1 for the same employee i and employer j. Formally, we deﬁne



















































In analogy we deﬁne the frequency of wage increases and decreases. The for-
mulas are included in Appendix C.1 together with the deﬁnitions of the average
22The following analysis owes much to the methods used to study price stickiness using
micro consumer and producer price data, see e.g. Dhyne et al. (2005).18
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size of wage changes/increases/decreases. When applying the formulas to the
baseline or cleaned dataset, we refer to the results as direct measures of wage
adjustment.
3.4.3 Measure of wage frequency based on structural break test
In Section 3.2 we proposed to limit the measurement error in the dataset by fo-
cusing on well-behaved wage trajectories and eliminating implausible patterns
of wage adjustment. Admittedly, the procedure can provide but a judgemental
assessment of the underlying degree of wage ﬂexibility. As a means of cross-
checking, in this section, we describe a complementary method for handling
measurement error in wage datasets as proposed by Gottschalk (2005). The
method is based on the test procedure for identifying multiple endogenous struc-
tural breaks in time series developed by Bai and Perron (1998) and is based on
the assumption that an error-free wage trajectory is a step function. By con-
trast, wage changes other than those suggesting a break in the wage trajectory
are considered reﬂecting measurement error. The aim of the multiple break
point test proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) is to model a given series (i.e. a
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¯ w1+et if t =1 ,...,T1
¯ w2+et if t = T1 +1 ,...,T2
¯ w3+et if t = T2 +1 ,...,T3
... ...
¯ wM−1+et if t = TM−2 +1 ,...,TM−1
¯ wM+et if t = TM−1 +1 ,...,TM
¯ wM+1+et if t = TM +1 ,...,T
(2)
where equation (2) omits the ij superscript and hence w
ij
t (wt) denote the wage
observed for an occupation between worker i and ﬁrm j in period t, Tm denotes
the mth break date (where m ∈{ 1,...,M})a n det denotes the residual. ¯ w1 to
¯ wM+1 stand for the M +1wage levels prevailing between any two (out of a
total M) subsequent break dates.
The multiple break point test proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) provides
a least squares estimator of the number of break points (M) and their timing
(T1 to TM) as well as the corresponding wage levels ( ¯ w1 to ¯ wM+1) based on
a recursive algorithm. Intuitively, the procedure identiﬁes the ﬁrst structural
break as the one leading to the lowest sum of squared residuals over the two
subsamples. Next, we test the null hypothesis of no break versus the alternative
of a single break. If one break is identiﬁed, the sample is broken at that break
point and the test is applied again to split the samples. In this second round
the null hypothesis is that there is only one break and the alternative is that
there are two breaks. In practice the regression model is the same at each stage
but the critical values for ﬁnding additional breaks become stricter with each
successive test. Details on the procedure and its implementation are provided
in Appendix C.2.19
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The working assumption of this test when applied to micro wage data is that
break points will be identiﬁed whenever the change in the mean wage between
two subsequent segments is suﬃciently large relative to the variation of the wage
around the mean within the segment. The rejection of the null hypothesis of no
structural change is meant to characterise a genuine wage change. By contrast,
wage changes not leading to a suﬃciently large variation are considered reﬂecting
measurement error. Bai and Perron (1998) show that the asymptotic properties
of their multiple break point test hold for a very general form of measurement
error.23
We apply the break test to the baseline dataset after removing outliers in the
wage change distribution and after requiring a minimum length of 36 months for
each wage trajectory. The choice of maximum number of breaks is determined
by the trajectory length and asymptotical critical values reported by Bai and
Perron (1998). For a wage trajectory consisting of 72 observations this implies
nine breaks. Taken into account that six rounds of wage indexation occured in
the period under study, this upper limit might be too restrictive. For this reason
we removed from the baseline dataset wage changes that are due to institutional
factors, namely wage changes due to indexation, changes in the statutory mini-
mum wage, age and marital status. The results of the multiple breakpoint test
indicate that the upper bound is not too restrictive (see Section 4.2). After
obtaining estimates of the trajectory consisting of ¯ w1 to ¯ wM+1 (see equation
(2)), we can apply the formula in equation (1) to this trajectory to obtain a
measure of frequency of wage change implied by the break point test. To allow
for comparison with the direct measures of wage change frequency that include
institutional wage changes, we deﬁne the augmented frequency of wage change
by adding the number of institutional wage changes that were removed from
the baseline dataset to the number of structural breaks identiﬁed by the multi-
ple break point test. This is clearly an upper bound on the true frequency as
some of the institutional wage changes might not have been considered as struc-
tural breaks if the procedure allowed for higher maximum number of structural
breaks.
4 Results
In this section we provide results on the frequency and size of base wage changes
in Luxembourg. First, we discuss direct measures of wage adjustment based
on the baseline, cleaned and adjusted dataset. To compare our results with
the literature, we also report the year on year frequency of wage change. We
supplement the evidence on direct measures with results obtained from the break
test and ﬁnally we explore the diﬀerences in the frequency and the magnitude
of wage changes across ﬁrms of diﬀerent size, public and private institutions,
sectors of the economy, months etc.
23The critical values provided by Bai and Perron (1998) can be safely used in the case where
some data are trending.20
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4.1 Direct measures of wage change frequency and size
4.1.1 Unadjusted frequency and size of wage change
Based on the baseline dataset, the overall frequency of a base wage change is
57% (see Table 1). The frequency of wage increases (wage cuts) is 34% (24%).24
Thus, the relative share of wage increases/wage cuts in total wage changes is
roughly 60%:40%. We observe substantial heterogeneity across occupational
groups. The highest frequency of wage change appears for blue-collar workers
(77%), while the lowest frequency of wage change applies to civil servants (29%).
For white-collar employees, the frequency of wage change is 42%. The frequency
of wage cuts ranges from 5% in the case of civil servants to 35% in the case of
blue-collar workers. The proportion of wage cuts in all wage changes, therefore,
ranges from 18% in the case of civil servants to 45% blue-collar workers.
Section 3.2 discussed the potential measurement error stemming from the
fact that overtime hours and compensation are not explicitly reported in the
dataset. In the clean dataset we limit the scope of measurement error and this
has a substantial impact on the observed frequency of wage change. Overall,
the frequency of wage change declines from 57% to 14%, see Table 2.25 The
impact of measurement error diﬀers substantially across occupational groups.
In the case of blue-collar workers, the frequency of wage change falls to 13%
(i.e. a drop of more than 60 percentage points when compared to the baseline
dataset). By contrast, the above adjustments have a fairly limited impact on
the frequency of wage change in the case of civil servants (21%, down from 29%)
implying that their recorded wages are relatively less aﬀected by measurement
error or that there is less scope for paid overtime work. After adjusting for
measurement error, the highest frequency of wage change is observed for civil
servants.26 Their high frequency of wage change, however, results from a high
frequency of wage increases (above 20%), while at the same time they exhibit
a relatively small frequency of wage cuts). Moreover, limiting the measurement
error has an important implication for the relative importance of wage cuts.
Their share in total wage changes diminishes to 4% (from more than 40% in the
baseline dataset).27 The strongest degree of asymmetry between wage increases
and wage cuts is observed for civil servants with wage cuts representing less than
2% of all wage changes. Finally, limiting measurement error not only leads to
a lower frequency of wage change but also to smaller wage changes on average
(3.3% compared to an unadjusted 6.6%).28
4.1.2 Accounting for institutionally determined wage changes
In this section we discuss the importance of wage changes that are due to insti-
tutional factors as these wage changes do not necessarily reﬂect the true degree
of wage ﬂexibility from the point of view of the ﬁrm. More speciﬁcally, we adjust
24Diﬀerences due to rounding.
25This would correspond to an increase in the implied average duration of wage spells from
1.2 months to 6.5 months.
26The implied average duration of wage spells ranges from 4.3 months to 7.3 months.
27Again, the more than proportional decline in the number of wage cuts suggests that the
measures in Section 3.2 succeed in eliminating wage changes around the general trend.
28This might primarily reﬂect the fact that we removed huge (and tiny) wage changes in
the cleaning procedure in Section 3.2.21
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for the eﬀects of wage indexation, changes in the statutory minimum wage, age
and marital status.
Overall, after adjusting for wage changes due to indexation, the frequency
of wage change drops from 14.3% to 7.4% (see Table 3, section I). Overall, thus,
wage indexation accounts for almost one half of all wage changes observed in the
cleaned dataset. For all three occupational groups, adjusting for wage indexa-
tion leads to substantially lower estimates of the frequency of wage change. The
share of wage changes due to indexation in total wage changes ranges from 37%
(civil servants) to 56% (blue-collar workers).29 Interestingly, adjusting for wage
indexation not only leads to a substantially lower frequency of wage increases
but it also increases the measured frequency of wage cuts (from 0.6% to 1.4%).
This suggests that although ﬁrms are legally required to index base wages by
2.5% in the event of wage indexation, for a subset of workers the wage increase
reported right in the month of wage indexation is lower than the standard 2.5%.
This does not necessarily suggest that the salaries of these employees are not
increasing by a full 2.5% around the time wage indexation kicks in.30 The in-
crease in the frequency of wage cuts after adjusting for wage indexation is lowest
for civil servants (0.4%), whose employers might be expected to follow the legal
provisions most strictly.
As in the case of wage indexation, adjusting for changes in the minimum
wage implies a reduction in the overall frequency of wage change, see Table 3
Section II. As expected, the impact of this adjustment is substantially smaller
than in the case of adjustments for wage indexation, lowering the overall fre-
quency of wage change by slightly more than 0.2 percentage points. Adjusting
for changes in the minimum wage, too, has an asymmetric impact on the fre-
quencies of upward and downward wage changes. On the one hand, the overall
frequency of wage increases declines (from 13.7% to 13.5%). On the other hand,
adjusting for changes in the statutory minimum wage has virtually no impact
the frequency of wage cuts (0.6%). As illustrated in Table 3, the observed re-
duction in the frequency of wage increases does not apply to civil servants. By
contrast, the largest reduction is observed for white-collar workers (from 12.8%
to 12.5%).31 As adjusting for minimum wage changes has no impact on the
frequency of wage cuts, there is no evidence of an incomplete adjustment of
salaries in the event of changes in the statutory minimum wage.
29This diﬀerence in the relative share of wage changes due to wage indexation is by and
large due to diﬀerences in the overall frequency of wage change between the three stati. By
contrast, omitting wage changes due to wage indexation leads to a fairly similar reduction in
the frequency of wage change in absolute terms (between 6.5 percentage points in the case of
white-collar employees and 7.7 percentage points in the case of civil servants.
30For instance, numerically, wage increases of 2.5% could be achieved via a set of smaller
wage increases around the time of wage indexation. Alternatively, ﬁrms could anticipate the
wage indexation or postpone the 2.5% wage increase (and compensate for the foregone wage
increases at a later stage). Strictly speaking, however, ﬁrms are required to apply the 2.5%
increase to the wage prevailing in the month prior to indexation, regardless of whether they
already implemented a wage increase shortly before indexation or not. Similarly, ﬁrms are
not allowed to delay the implementation of wage indexation, even when compensating for the
foregone increase later on.
31The diﬀerences with regard to the impact of adjusting for changes in the minimum wage
across stati are likely linked to diﬀerences in the proportion of employees/workers/civil servants
subject to the statutory minimum wage.22
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Removing wage changes related to changes in age and marital status re-
duces the overall frequency of wage change to 14.0% (down from an unadjusted
14.3%, see Table 3 Section III. A lower frequency of wage change is observed
for all occupational groups, the largest reduction appearing for civil servants
(19.3%, down from an unadjusted 20.7%). For blue-collar workers and white-
collar employees, the reduction in the frequency of wage change is marginal
(less than 0.25 percentage points). The diﬀerences between stati are likely to
reﬂect a diﬀerent degree to which changes in age and/or marital status give rise
to changes in salaries according to their collective wage agreement. As such
clauses are most common in the public service sector, the diﬀerences between
occupational groups might reﬂect the diﬀerent proportions of employees in the
public and private sector. Similar to adjustments for changes in the minimum
wage, adjusting for wage changes due to age and/or marital status has virtually
no impact on the measured frequency of wage cuts.
The combined impact of all adjustments on the frequency of wage adjust-
ment is sizeable (see Table 4). Overall, the adjusted frequency of wage change
is 7.0% (down from 14.3% in the cleaned dataset). More than one half of all
wage changes in the cleaned dataset are institutional. Overall, after all adjust-
ments, the relative share of wage cuts in wage changes rises to almost 20%,
after approximately 4% in the cleaned dataset.32 Combining all three types
of adjustments yields a reduction in the measured frequency of wage change by
−6.7 percentage points (white-collar employees) to −8.6 percentage points (civil
servants). Moreover, the adjustments have a more than proportional impact on
the frequency of wage cuts. Adjusting for institutional wage changes has no
impact on the ordering of the frequency of wage change by occupational group.
As in the cleaned dataset, the highest frequency of wage change is observed for
civil servants (12.0%).33 The frequencies for blue-collar workers and white-collar
employees are 5.1% and 8.2%, respectively. Again, the high frequency of wage
change for civil servants reﬂects a relatively high frequency of wage increases
(11.6% compared to 6.1% and 4.3% in the case of white-collar employees and
blue-collar workers). At the same time, civil servants reveal the lowest frequency
of wage cuts (less than 0.5%). For workers and employees, the frequency of wage
cuts is higher (0.8% and 2.1%, respectively). Consequently, the share of wage
cuts in total wage changes is extremely low for civil servants (less than 4% com-
pared to an overall 20%). By contrast, adjusting for institutional wage changes
in general has a limited impact on the average size of wage changes (3.8% after
combining all adjustments compared to 3.3% in the cleaned dataset).34
4.1.3 Year on year frequency of wage change
The extent to which wages respond to negative shocks (such as decline in de-
mand) is examined in a growing literature on downward wage rigidities. Papers
32According to our a priori beliefs, purely institutional wage changes almost always lead to
wage increases. Note that this applies also to wage changes resulting from wage indexation.
The measured increase in the frequency of wage cuts, however, suggests that in some cases
wages increase by less than the full 2.5%.
33Again, civil servants’ wages may rise more frequently but they increase by less on average.
34The one exception being that adjusting for wage indexation substantially reduces the
average size of wage cuts. This is related to the number of cases in which wages rise by less
than 2.5% in the case wage indexation.23
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using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, a large representative
survey dataset for the US, typically ﬁnd that 7%–10% of respondents working
for the same employer in two interviews one year apart report the same nominal
wage in both interviews. At the same time 15%–20% of respondents experi-
ence a cut in nominal wage between the interviews. Depending on the point
of view, these results were interpreted both as an evidence downward nominal
wage rigidity and wage ﬂexibility.35 On the other hand, studies based on wage
records from individual ﬁrms (Altonji and Devreux (2000)) or speciﬁc labour
markets (Akerlof et al. (1996)) ﬁnd that only two to three percent of employees
experience nominal wage cut during one year and that the prevalence of con-
stant wages is higher than that found in the PSID. More speciﬁcally, Altonji
and Devreux (2000) report that only half percent of salaried workers and 2.5
percent of hourly workers in a large U.S. ﬁnancial corporation experienced nom-
inal wage cuts in a one-year period. In contrast to the ﬁndings from the PSID
studies, this implies substantial downward nominal wage rigidity. Gottschalk
(2005) reconciles these ﬁndings by concluding that larger part of the nominal
wage cuts for hourly workers in the PSID are a result of mesurement error in the
survey data. After applying a structural break test to the PSID data to remove
measurement error in the wage series, he ﬁnds that only 4%–5% of respondents
working for the same employer in two interviews one year apart received a nom-
inal wage cut. At the same time, constant wages were much more common than
in the unadjusted data comprising of 49%–54% of observations.
For the sake of comparison with the numbers reported in the literature, Ta-
ble 10 provides the annual direct frequency of wage decreases and constant wage
in the three diﬀerent datasets considered in this paper—the raw, baseline and
cleaned datasets. It is derived the same way as the monthly frequency discussed
in Section 3.4.2 except that all references to t − 1 are replaced by references to
t − 12. In the raw and baseline datasets, approximately 12.5% of occupations
(for which a wage quote for the same month in the previous year exists) are
characterised by a decrease in base wage, while about 3% occupations are re-
porting the same wage. The picture is substantially diﬀerent in the cleaned dat
set that limits the degree of measurement error. Here, the probability of yearly
decline in the base wage is less than 1 percent and the probability of constant
wage for a period of one year is more than 4 percent. Compared to the results of
Gottschalk (2005), we ﬁnd less wage cuts that would be sustained for a one-year
period and also substantially fewer constant wages. This suggests that Luxem-
bourg cannot be characterized by substantial downward nominal wage rigidity
(DNWR).36 Compared to the results of Altonji and Devreux (2000), the prob-
abilities of yearly decline in the base wage are of the same order of magnitude.
However, we ﬁnd less wage cuts for blue-collar workers and more wage cuts for
white-collar workers than Altonji and Devreux (2000).
35Card and Hyslop (1996) and Kahn (1997) stress the presence of a spike at zero in the
nominal wage change distribution which they interpret as a strong evidence of downward nom-
inal wage rigidity. On the other hand, McLaughlin (1994) compares the cumulative density
below zero with the correponding density in the upper tail of the wage change distribution
and concludes that due to the symmetry of the whole distribution, nominal wages are not
rigid.
36DNWR implies that in a histogram of wage changes, one observes a spike at zero (constant
wages) and a low density in the area left from zero (few wage cuts). DRWR also implies few
wage cuts, however, the spike in the wage change histogram appears at the (expected) inﬂation
or more speciﬁcally at the wage bargaining focal point.24
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Put together, the pieces of evidence presented so far strongly suggest that
wages in Luxembourg are subject to high degree of donward real wage rigidity
(DRWR). DRWR implies that only few wages are cut in real terms, i.e. either
the nominal wage decreases or it grows by less than the (expected) inﬂation
rate. Because wages in Luxembourg are automatically and fully indexed to CPI
inﬂation, wages would not be downward rigid in real terms only if the eﬀect of
indexation was reversed by nominal wage cuts in other months. However, we
have already documented that less than one percent of (nominal) wages are cut
both from month to month or from year to year. This suggests that undercutting
the wage indexation growth is not common in Luxembourg.
4.2 Results based on the multiple break test
As a means of cross-checking, we present estimates of the frequency of wage
change based on the multiple break test proposed by Bai and Perron (1998).
According to Table 11, the overall frequency of wage change is approximately
4.8%.37 The formal break point test, therefore, yields an even lower frequency of
wage change than the direct measures of wage ﬂexibility based on the adjusted
dataset as discussed in Section 4.1.2 (reporting the overall frequency of wage
change of 7%). As already indicated in Section 3.4.3, given the length of wage
trajectories in the dataset, the overall low frequency of wage change obtained
by the breakpoint test might be due to the restriction on the maximum number
of breakpoints. The maximum number of breaks allowed is binding for 8.3% of
wage trajectories.38 This might imply understating the true frequency of wage
change in the case of frequent wage adjustments.
The frequency of wage cuts in the breakpoint test (0.8%) is also lower than
the corresponding direct measure based on the adjusted dataset and so is the
proportion of wage cuts in overall wage changes (16.9% in the break test and
19.5% in the adjusted dataset). Again, this share is in the same order of mag-
nitude as the share of price cuts in total price changes for consumer services.39
The results from the break point test procedure therefore conﬁrm that wage
changes and especially wage cuts are fairly infrequent.
Moreover, in spite of the slightly diﬀerent overall level of the frequency es-
timates, we obtain identical rankings according to occupational status. Both
the simple measures and the breakpoint test suggest that the highest frequency
of wage change is found among civil servants, whereas the lowest frequency is
obtained for blue-collar workers. This ﬁnding might suggest that the adjusted
wage trajectories still entail elements of institutional wage changes. In particu-
lar, one reason for a lower frequency of wage change of blue collar workers could
be a longer average duration of collective wage agreements.
37Again, the overall frequency is weighted by the proportion of observations per occupational
group in the raw data.
38For wage trajectories prevailing throughout the entire dataset, the maximum number of
breaks allowed is nine and hence the frequency of wage change is implicitely truncated at
12.7%
39Although the relative shares of wage increases/cuts in total wage changes is fairly similar
at the aggregate level, we do obtain a slightly diﬀerent proportion of wage cuts at the level of
two occupational groups, i.e. for white-collar employees and blue-collar workers.25
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4.3 Results for diﬀerent categories
4.3.1 Firm characteristics
Evidence from micro price studies suggests that prices subject to regulation dis-
play more price rigidity than freely determined prices. Dhyne et al. (2005) study
a selection of 50 products and report that administered prices exhibit roughly
10% lower probability of price change than freely determined prices. Dexter
et al. (2004) report that signiﬁcant inertia in aggregate price adjustments is due
to the presence of price regulation. Against this background, we distinguish
between private and public employers.40 Table 7 reports the direct measure
of frequency of wage changes and the size of such changes for privately-owned
ﬁrms and public institutions in the adjusted dataset. To allow for diﬀerences
in the staﬀ composition in the public and the private sector, we present disag-
gregated results by occupational group. Our estimates suggest a substantially
higher frequency of wage change for public institutions. This applies to both
white-collar workers (12.6% in public sector versus 7.7% in private sector) and
blue-collar employees (12.5% in public sector versus 3.9% in private sector),
i.e. the two occupational groups featuring in both the private and the public
sector. We ﬁnd very small diﬀerences in the frequency of wage change only be-
tween the three occupational groups within the public sector (all between 12.0%
and 12.7%). The high frequency of wage changes observed in the public enter-
prises explains the high frequency of wage changes observed for civil servants
in previous sections given that by deﬁnition they are employed only by public
enterprises. The diﬀerence in the frequency of wage change between the public
and the private sector may be almost as large as nine percentage points (in the
case of blue-collar workers). The higher frequency of wage change in the public
sector is almost entirely due to more frequent wage increases, while at the same
time the frequency of wage cuts tends to be lower in the public sector. As wage
increases tend to be more frequent in the public sector, they also tend to be
smaller (e.g. 2.1% in the public sector versus 4.4% in the private sector in the
case of blue-collar workers, see Table 7).41 A similar general picture emerges
from the results based on the break test, see Table 14.
Firms of diﬀerent size have in general diﬀerent compensation policies. Large
ﬁrms typically have a more complex compensation policy with more variable
extra-wage components (like bonuses). Even though we take into account only
the base wage, the overall compensation policy can have an impact on the fre-
quency of base wage adjustment. Heckel et al. (2008) ﬁnd in their dataset
for France an increasing frequency of base wage change with the exception of
the 0-20 employees category. Our results based both on the direct measure of
frequency using the adjusted dataset in Table 6 and on the break test proce-
dure in Table 13 are in line with this ﬁnding and suggest that larger ﬁrms are
40The database does not provide information on the public/private nature of the ﬁrm. As
the second-best proxy, we classify a ﬁrm in the public sector if and only if there is at least one
staﬀ member with civil servant status. We cannot exclude that there are public institutions
only employing blue-collar and white-collar workers. This might lead to an underestimation
of the spread between public and private ﬁrms.
41Given the substantial degree of heterogeneity in the frequency of wage change by sector,
we cannot exclude that the comparison between the public and the private sector is aﬀected
by a diﬀerent composition of their activities. Unfortunately, there are very few hybrid sectors
in which both private and public sector ﬁrms operate.26
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characterised by more frequent base wage adjustment. The frequency of wage
change reported in Table 6 varies from 4.2% for small companies (i.e. less than
15 employees) to 10.2% for large companies (i.e. 150 or more employees). For
medium-sized companies, the frequency of wage change is 6.4%. The diﬀer-
ences across size categories can be primarily related to the diﬀerences in the
frequency of wage increases as the frequency of wage cuts varies only between
1.1% and 1.7% in the adjusted dataset and between 0.7 and 0.8% in the break
test procedure.42
4.3.2 Sectors of the economy
The frequency of wage change by NACE sectors is reported in Table 5 for the
adjusted and clean dataset and in Table 12 for the break test procedure. We ﬁnd
substantial heterogeneity across sectors in both cases. The frequency of wage
change is always higher in the adjusted dataset than in the break test procedure.
Nevertheless, both approaches paint a similar picture. The four sectors with the
highest probability of a wage change are the same: Public administration (L),
Electricity, gas and water supply (E), Financial intermediation (J) and Educa-
tion (M). One can infer that the high frequency is related to the disproportionaly
large representation of public enterprises in the above mentioned sectors with
the exception of Financial intermediation. At the same time those four sectors
are characterised by the highest average monthly earnings among the NACE
sectors considered in the raw dataset (see Table 18). On the other hand, among
the four sectors with the lowest probabilities of a wage change we ﬁnd in both
cases Hotels and restaurants (H), Construction (F) and Mining and quarrying
(C), i.e. sectors with a disproportionally large number of blue-collar workers
employed in private enterprises who appear to have exceptionally low frequency
of wage change (see Table 14). Hotels and restaurants and Construction are
also characterised by low average monthly earnings.
The heterogeneity across sectors relates to both the frequency of wage in-
creases (varying between 2.3% in Hotels and restaurants (H) and 11.5% in Public
administration (L)) and wage cuts (varying from 0.4% in Public administration
(L) to 3.2% in Financial intermediation (J)), numbers refer to the direct mea-
sure of wage change frequency based on the adjusted dataset as reported in
Table 5. For all sectors (save Financial intermediation), the frequency of wage
cuts is less than 2%. The median and the average shares of wage cuts in total
wage changes are approximately 21%.43
How does the frequency of wage change compare with the evidence on price
adjustment? The overall (weighted average) frequency of wage change in the
cleaned dataset (14%) and the augmented wage change frequency obtained from
the break test (9%) are both lower than the average consumer price change
frequency in Luxembourg (17% reported by Lünnemann and Mathä (2005))
and the average frequency of producer price change in 6 euro area countries
excluding Luxembourg (21% reported by Vermeulen et al. (2007)). However,
the frequency of wage change are still higher than estimates of the frequency of
42As a result, larger companies reveal a higher proportion of wage increases in total wage
changes (86-88% versus 74-78% in small and in medium-sized companies).
43This is similar to the 80:20 split for changes in services prices typically reported in the
analysis of micro price data Dhyne et al. (2005).27
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consumer prices changes in the Luxembourg service sector (i.e 7% according to
Lünnemann and Mathä (2005)).
4.3.3 Months
Evidence from various euro area countries suggests that the frequency of price
change may exhibit strong seasonal patterns, in particular that the frequency of
price change is typically highest in January. The special role of this month for
price dynamics applies in particular to services prices. Based on their analysis
of consumer prices in Luxembourg, Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) ﬁnd that
almost 15% of services’ prices change in January. Moreover, approximately one
in six changes in service prices occurs in January. Figure 1 shows the frequency
of wage change by month based on the adjusted dataset and break test.
The average frequency of wage change is 7% in the adjusted dataset and
4.8% in the break test procedure.44 Despite the diﬀerence in the average fre-
quency, the pattern observed across months is very similar. We observe distinct
spikes in the months of January and there are also apparent spikes in the event
of wage indexation in the adjusted dataset. The break point test is capable of
disregarding wage changes in the adjusted dataset that are part of partial/early
or delayed indexation and hence the spikes are less prominent as one could
expect if the adjustment for indexation was perfect. In ordinary months the
frequency of wage change is a mere 3.8% in the adjusted dataset and 3.3% in
the break test procedure, see Table 9 and Table 15. By contrast, in the month
of January and in the event of wage indexation the frequency rises to almost
37% and 15% in the adjusted dataset and to 21% and 6% in the break proce-
dure.45 The predominance of wage changes occuring in the month of January
or in the event of wage indexation suggests that the overall measured frequency
of wage change tends to overstate the ﬂexibility at the discretion of the ﬁrms.
Moreover, the high concentration of wage changes around two distinct types of
periods (i.e. months with wage indexation and the month of January) suggests
that wage changes tend to be synchronised.
In the adjusted dataset, for all occupational groups the month of January
is clearly marked by the highest frequency of wage change (24.1%, 38.4% and
98.6% for workers, employees and civil servants, respectively). The histogram of
wage changes in the months of January in Figure 2 highlights the concetration
of wage increases between 0.5% to 1% and at 1.5%. This is likely to reﬂect
wage changes due to (new) collective wage agreements. In Luxembourg, most
of such collective agreements (and changes to existing agreements) enter into
eﬀect beginning January. This is particularly evident from the very high fre-
44The ﬁrst and last two observations were disregarded because they are not considered a
potential break date in the break test. For the direct measures, by deﬁnition, only the ﬁrst
observation is not considered a potential break date.
45This is the frequency of wage change after adjusting for changes due to wage indexation,
changes in the statutory minimum wage and changes in age/marital status. As illustrated
in Table 8, the distinctive spikes in the frequency of wage change are even more prominent
in the cleaned dataset. Without adjusting for institutional wage changes, the frequency of
wage change reaches 4.2% in ordinary months, but rises to 52.9% in the month of January
and to 98.3% in the months in which wage indexation kicks in. Overall, in unadjusted terms,
approximately 25% of all observed wage changes take place in the month January and one
out of two wage changes occur in months in which wage indexation kicks in.28
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quency of wage change in the month of January for the case of civil servants.46
For services, Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) not only report an exceptionally
high frequency of price change, but also an exceptionally high share of price
increases in the month of January in Luxembourg (i.e. approximately 80% of
all price changes). For wages, in the month of January, the share of increases
in total changes is even higher (between 96% and 97% in both the adjusted
and cleaned dataset and in the break test procedure), also in comparison with
ordinary calendar months (86% and 87% in the adjusted and cleaned dataset,
respectively and 81% in the break test procedure).
In the month of January the high adjusted frequency of wage change is due
to very frequent wage increases but in the case of months with wage indexation,
the rise in the adjusted frequency is mostly due to a larger number of (adjusted)
wage cuts relative to the other two periods, see Table 9 and Table 15.47 This can
be a result of incomplete/deferred/early indexation or might reﬂect misclassiﬁ-
cation of hourly and salaried workers. While an extraordinarily high frequency
of wage change in monthss of indexation could also be achieved in the case of
full-indexation of wages coinciding with a wage cut for reasons other than in-
dexation, the overall low frequency of genuine wage cuts makes a scenario of
two simultaneous wage changes rather unlikely.
The overall frequency of wage increases (cuts) in these periods is 4.9% (9.6%)
in the adjusted dataset and 3.1% (3%) in the break test procedure. Contrary to
blue-collar workers and white-collar employees, wage reductions remain fairly
infrequent in the event of wage indexation in the case of civil servants (and much
less frequent than wage increases). In the case of civil servants, thus, there is
no evidence of an incomplete application of wage indexation. In general, ﬁrms
operating in countries with automatic wage indexation might face serious real
downward wage rigidity to the extent that they cannot implement wage changes
smaller than those stipulated by wage indexation. In Luxembourg, the vast ma-
jority of wages are increased exactly by 2.5% in the event of indexation (see the
spike at zero in the adjusted dataset in Figure 2) and only a small proportion of
wages are increased by less than the 2.5% threshold in an indexation event (i.e.
the adjusted wage change is below zero). Figure 2 also demonstrates that wages
change relatively infrequently from one month to another (spikes at zero). After
adjusting for indexation, slightly more than 50% of all wage cuts take place in
months with wage indexation.
4.3.4 Heterogeneity across ﬁrms
Figure 3 below illustrates the distribution of the frequency of wage change across
companies. We obtain a substantial degree of heterogeneity across the 10 874
ﬁrms in the adjusted dataset. Overall, the frequency of wage change varies from
0% to 41.7%. As expected, the distribution of the frequency of wage change by
ﬁrm reveals a high degree of skewness. Approximately 22% of all ﬁrms in the
adjusted dataset never changed wages. The average (median) frequency of wage
46Civil servants tend to be remunerated acoording to a unique collective wage agreement
typically entering into force in the month of January.
47A wage decrease in the indexation period in the adjusted dataset has to be interpreted as
a wage change lower than 2.5% in unadjusted terms.29
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change per ﬁrm is 4.8% (3.6%). For less than one out of 7 ﬁrms, the frequency of
wage change is higher than 10%. Moreover, for approximately 3/4 of all ﬁrms
the frequency of wage change is lower or equal to the reported frequency of
service price change. Finally, more than one half of all ﬁrms did not cut wages
during the sample period. The average (median) frequency of wage cut across
ﬁrms is 1.5% (0%).
5C o n c l u s i o n
The paper provides a unique insight into the wage adjustment process at the
microeconomic level using an administrative monthly data set covering all ﬁrms
and employees in Luxembourg between January 2001 and December 2006. The
frequency of wage adjustment has important implications for the optimal mon-
etary policy, price adjustment and labour market outcomes, such as unemploy-
ment rates.
The dataset does not provide explicit information on overtime work and
compensation and hence we employ two diﬀerent procedures to limit the im-
pact of variation in overtime worktime and compensation on the frequency of
base wage. First, we deﬁned well-behaved trajectories of hours and removed
implausible patterns of wage adjustment. As such approach can be considered
judgemental, we apply in addition a structural break test to the individual wage
trajectories. This approach is based on the assumption that the true wage tra-
jectory follows a step function. Without limiting the impact of measurement er-
ror due to overtime work, the overall monthly frequency of wage change reaches
57%. After cleaning the dataset, the frequency drops to 14% and the augmented
frequency from the break test provides an upper bound of the wage change fre-
quency at 9%. The resulting average wage change frequency is lower than the
consumer price change frequency in Luxembourg (17% reported by Lünnemann
and Mathä (2005)), but higher than their estimate of the frequency of price
change for consumer services (7%).
Even genuine wage changes that do not reﬂect measurement error are not
necessarily a sound indicator of true wage ﬂexibility as some of them might
be determined by institutional factors. For this reason, we adjust for wage
changes due to indexation, changes in the statutory minimum wage, age and
marital status. As a result, the the direct measure of frequency of wage change
is lowered to 7%, while the break test leads to a frequency of 5%. This suggests
that wage ﬂexibility at the discretion of the ﬁrm is rather low.
In addition, we ﬁnd a substantial degree of heterogeneity across ﬁrms of
diﬀerent size, between public and private ﬁrms, across sectors of the economy,
occupational groups and diﬀerent periods. Blue-collar workers reveal the low-
est frequency of wage change, while civil servants exhibit the highest frequency.
The same reasoning explains why public sector enterprises have higher frequency
of wage change than private enterprises. While wages of civil servants change
more often, they change by the smallest amount at the same time. Our results
also suggest that larger ﬁrms tend to change wages more often. Moreover, we
ﬁnd that wage changes tend to be highly synchronised as they are concentrated
around months of wage indexation and the month of January. In a typical year,
approximately 50% of all wage changes occur in the event of indexation and
another one quarter of wage changes is observed in January, reﬂecting the pre-30
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dominant share of collective wage agreements entering into eﬀect in this month.
Nearly all wages change in the event of wage indexation. The concentration of
wage changes around two types of periods implies a high degree of synchronisa-
tion of wage changes.
The picture that emerges from the pieces of evidence presented in this paper
is a situation of substantial DRWR in Luxembourg. DRWR implies that only
few wages are cut in real terms, i.e. either the nominal wage decreases or it
grows by less than the (expected) inﬂation rate. Vast majority of wages in
Luxembourg increase by 2.5% in the event of indexation. We documented that
less than one percent of (nominal) wages are cut both from month to month
and from year to year. Quantifying the degree of DRWR in Luxembourg and
comparing it to other countries remains a task for future research.31
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Appendix
A Additional details on Luxembourg and its labour
market
A.1 Key macroeconomic indicators of Luxembourg
On average, the sample period is characterized by moderately strong economic
growth and moderate to high inﬂation rates. Overall, the average annual growth
in GDP between 2000 and 2006 stood at 4.1%. Over the sample period, the
growth dynamics changed quite substantially. In 2003 the Luxembourg economy
grew only 2.1%, but by 2006 the growth rate almost tripled (6.1%). Moreover,
the growth dynamics reveal a high degree of heterogeneity across economic sec-
tors. In selected sectors, gross value added increased by more than 5% per an-
num over the sample period. This applies to Financial intermediation (NACE
J, 7.4%), Health and social work (NACE N, 6.3%), Transport, storage and com-
munication (NACE I, 5.7%) and Construction (NACE F, 5.4%). By contrast,
gross value added actually fell in Activities of households (NACE P, -8.4%),
Agriculture, hunting and forestry and ﬁshing (NACE AB, -4.7%) and Hotels
and restaurants (NACE H, -2.2%). Throughout the sample period, the annual
increase in the price level according to the HICP was approximately 2.8% on av-
erage. Again, the inﬂation rate varied quite substantially throughout the years
2001 - 2006. During the period 2001 − 2003, the increase in the general price
level remained around (2.1% − 2.5%). In 2004 and 2005, HICP inﬂation sub-
stantially increased to 3.2% in 2004 and 3.8% in 2005. In 2006, average annual
inﬂation moderated to 3.0%, a rate still fairly high compared to the increases
in the price level observed in the euro area.
A.2 Aggregate labour market ﬁgures
During the sample period, on average, more than 300 000 occupations48 per
month were recorded in Luxembourg. In 2001, the average number of occupa-
tions was roughly 277 000. In 2006, the average number of occupations was
almost 330 000. (average annual growth in the number of occupations: 3.5%).
The largest sectors (in terms of average number of occupations per month) are
Real estate, renting and business activities (NACE K, 16.9%), Wholesale and
retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household
goods (NACE G, 12.4%) and Financial intermediation (NACE J, 11.6%). Oc-
cupations are fairly asymmetrically distributed across economic sectors. During
the sample period the six largest sectors account for almost 3/4 of all occupa-
tions, while the nine smallest sectors accounted for 17% of all occupations.
The average number of ﬁrms per month is higher than 25 000. In 2001, the
average number of ﬁrms per month was roughly 23 000, in 2006 the average
48Hereafter, the term occupation characterises a unique employer-employee relationship in
the absence of obvious "qualitative changes" in this relationship, such as a change from full-
time to part-time aﬃliation. Each occupation is characterised by a single wage trajectory. As
a consequence, an occupation is the lowest level of aggregation for which a frequency of wage
change can be derived. This applies to both the judgemental rules and the breakpoint test.
To the extent that a given position with a speciﬁc ﬁrm is held by diﬀerent employees (due to
replacement), a single position is aﬃliated with several wage trajectories.35
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number of ﬁrms was more than 28 000. The average annual increase in the
number of ﬁrms over the sample period was 4.2%. The three largest sectors (in
terms of average number of ﬁrms per month) are Activities of households (NACE
P, 32.4%), Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and
personal and household goods (NACE G, 16.1%) and Real estate, renting and
business activities (NACE K, 13.2%).
The strong employment growth observed over the sample period is also re-
ﬂected in a strong increase in the total wage bill. Starting oﬀ with some EUR
9.2 bn in 2001, the total amount of wages (i.e. base wage and bonuses) increased
to EUR 12.6 bn in 2006 (i.e. an average annual growth rate of 6.4%). The share
of the volume of bonuses paid in the total wage bill was approximately 8.5%
(9.1% in 2006). The largest sectros in terms of wage bill (excluding bonuses)
are Financial intermediation (NACE J, 17.8%), Public administration and de-
fence; compulsory social security (NACE L, 15.8%)and Real estate, renting and
business activities (NACE K, 13.3%).
Not only do we observe substantial heterogeneity with regard to the size of
the sectors within the Luxembourg economy, but also the growth pattern varies
substantially across sectors. This applies to the number of employers registered,
the number of occupations and the total amount of salaries and bonuses. From
2001 to 2006, on average, the number of occupations increased by an annual
3.5%. Whereas the number of occupations, on average, increased by more than
7% per annum in some sectors (e.g. NACE N Health and social work,N A C E
M Education and NACE P Activities of households), their number diminished
in NACE D Manufacturing). The amount of base wages increased by 6.2% on
average. Again, the rise in total wages has been particularly strong in NACE M
Education (+ 12.9% per annum) and NACE N Health and social work (11.4%).
By contrast, the annual growth in the base wagebill was 2.1% in NACE D
Manufacturing.
A.3 The wage bargaining process
The institutional aspects of the wage bargaining process constitute an important
background to the patterns of wage adjustment. The role of trade unions, the
degree of centralisation and coordination as well as the role of Government in-
tervention, may clearly inﬂuence wage setting. Not only can they may aﬀect the
level of wages (including their degree of dispersion and asymmetry; e.g. through
minimum wage schemes, see 2.2), but also the patterns of wage adjustment (both
with regard to the timing and the size of such adjustments; e.g. through wage
indexation (see 2.1)). In particular, the frequency of wage adjustments, their
size and the degree to which wage adjustments are synchronised bear important
implications for monetary policy. For example, collective wage bargaining might
lead to a strong resistance to nominal wage cuts on various grounds (such as fair-
ness considerations). During recessions, the scope for market clearing through
downward real wage adjustments may be fairly limited, with adjustment mainly
achieved through inﬂation. Other institutional elements of the wage bargaining
process may lead to stronger real wage rigidities (see, for example, Dickens et al.
(2008) on the role of unionisation). With perfect wage indexation, for example,
downward real wage adjustment cannot be achieved through inﬂation. Again
other institutional settings of the wage bargaining process may clearly aﬀect
the scope for wage adjustment through changes in the number of hours worked.36
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The regulations speciﬁed within a given wage agreement can create obstacles
to wage adjustment, but also the duration of such agreements can create an
additional element of rigidity (see Taylor (1983)). In their cross-country com-
parison covering 22 EU countries, the US and Japan, Du Caju et al. (2008)
report signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to the institutional features of wage
bargaining.49 In the following, key elements of the wage setting procedure in
Luxembourg are described.
Collectivisation is an important characteristic of the institutional settings of
the wage bargaining process. The degree of collectivisation is often measured by
the proportion of workers that are trade union members (trade union density)
and/or covered by a collective wage agreement (collective bargaining coverage).
Collectivisation may aﬀect the behaviour of wages in various ways. In partic-
ular, collectivisation may lead to a more uniform pattern of wage adjustment.
Ceteris paribus, this applies to both the timing and the size of such adjustments.
For Luxembourg, overall, Du Caju et al. (2008) report a ”moderate” degree of
trade union density (i.e. between 51% and 75% of all workers belonging to a
trade union). This overall ”moderate” degree of trade density is still relatively
high by European standards and compared to the US/Japan, which in general
feature trade union densities of less than or equal to 50% and less than or equal
to 25%, respectively. In Luxembourg, the degree of collectivisation varies sub-
stantially across sectors. In 2000 the proportion of workers belonging to a trade
union was less than or equal to 25% in agriculture, but trade union density
was 76% or higher in Industry, Market services and Non-market services.50 As
in many other developed countries, trade union coverage also varies according
to ﬁrm size. In addition, as in most European countries, extension procedures
apply in Luxembourg, extending the scope of collective agreements to all em-
ployees and employers within their usual ﬁeld of application (well beyond the
contracting employers and trade unions). The application of extension proce-
dures may lead to a degree of collectivisation much higher than suggested by
trade union density. However, in Luxembourg, extension procedures do not kick
in automatically. Rather, their implementation is subject to political debate
within the framework of public commissions.
The degree of centralisation in wage bargaining may also aﬀect the wage
level and wage adjustments. For example, a high degree of centralisation may
lead to a more homogeneous pattern of wage adjustment, in particular across
ﬁrms and/or regions. Empirical results obtained with micro data seem to con-
ﬁrm a narrowing of wage dispersion with highly centralized wage bargaining (see
Card and de la Rica (2006) and Cardoso and Portugal (2005)). Compared to its
neighbouring countries, wage bargaining in Luxembourg is rather decentralised
as wage bargaining usually occurs at the company level. Wage bargaining at the
sectoral level and at the occupational level also applies, but much less frequently.
The degree of coordination relates to the extent to which wage negotiations
are coordinated among the various wage bargaining levels/actors within an econ-
49Unless otherwise stated, the ﬁgures referred to in the remainder of this section are taken
from Du Caju et al. (2008).
50Note that for most countries the ﬁgures reported by Du Caju et al. (2008) refer to 1995,
while the ﬁgures for Luxembourg usually refer to 2000.37
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omy (Du Caju et al. (2008)). Coordination of wage bargaining can be horizontal
(i.e. synchronisation within a given level of bargaining parties) and vertical (syn-
chronisation across levels of bargaining). It can be implemented through diﬀer-
ent mechanisms, some of which are based on Government intervention (such as
state-imposed minimum wages) and others not (such as intra-associational co-
ordination). In Luxembourg, the dominant coordination mechanisms are based
on state-imposed minimum wages and state-imposed wage indexation.38
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BD a t a
B.1 Towards the baseline dataset
In this section we provide additional details on the restrictions applied to the
original dataset and their impact on the size and representativeness of the data.
Below we list the set of restrictions applied to the raw dataset. The impact
of each step separately on the number of observations in the raw dataset is
reported in Table 16.
1. Multiple occupations between any given employer-employee pair for any
given period t. As we cannot reliably distinguish between such multiple
occupations, the frequency and the size of wage adjustments cannot be
measured in any meaningful way. Overall, this reduces the number of
occupations by approximately 868 000 (i.e. 4% of the raw dataset), 92%
of which relating to blue-collar workers.51
2. Observations with missing information about the employer, the branch,
the number of hours worked, the salary earned, etc. This leads to a small
reduction in the number of observations (approximately 25 500, i.e. 0.1%),
87% of which relating to the blue-collar workers.
3. The last observation of every occupation. This is to avoid an upward bias
in the measured frequency of wage change due to one-oﬀ payments (e.g.
severance pay). The number of observations omitted is approximately
630 000 (i.e. 2.9% of all observations), roughly 2/3 of which relating to
the blue-collar workers.
4. Occupations characterised by less than six consecutive observations. This
is to insure a minimum degree of representativeness and to avoid to strong
an impact of a single wage change event. The number of observations
omitted is roughly 790 000 (i.e. 3.6% of all observations), more than 2/3
of which relating to blue-collar workers.
5. Observations revealing a very low/high number of hours worked. Occupa-
tions characterised by less than 40 hours worked per month often reveal
extremely low salaries, both in absolute terms and relative to the num-
ber of hours worked. It is likely that their remuneration is predominantly
driven by (administered) changes in the statutory minimum wage rather
than genuine changes in wage agreements between market participants. By
contrast, observations suggesting a monthly work load of 300 hours and
more are diﬃcult to interpret, most likely reﬂecting periods of overtime
at above-normal remuneration. This rule leads to the largest reduction in
the number of observations (7.2%). More than 85% of the observations
omitted relate to blue-collar workers.
6. Individuals above the retirement age and younger than 18 years. Obser-
vations related to such situations form less than 0.5% of the raw dataset.
51Note that the share of blue-collar workers in the initial sample is approximately 47%
in terms of observations. Approximately 45% (8%) of all observations relate to white-collar
employees (civil servants).39
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7. Observations reﬂecting changes to the employment status during a given
month t. "Mid-month" changes in the employment status (e. g. employee
leaving for (pre-)retirement, parental leave, change of employer) lead to
an upward bias in the measured degree of wage ﬂexibility. This rule leads
to the third largest reduction in the umber of observations (almost 1.2
million, or 5.4% of all observations), almost 83% relating to blue-collar
workers.
8. Observations implying an hourly wage rate below the statutory minimum
wage wage.52 This leads to a reduction in the number of observations by
roughly 575 000 (i.e. 2.6%).
9. Observations in Activities of households (NACE P). The number of ob-
servations omitted is roughly 620 000 (i.e. 2.9% of all observations), 99%
of which relating to blue-collar workers.
10. Observations referring to ﬁrms that existed for less than 36 months. This
is to avoid any bias due to wage setting practices which might/did turn
out to be unsustainable over a suﬃciently long period of time. It leads to
a reduction in the number of observations by roughly 1.1 million (4.9%),
55% of which relating to blue-collar workers.
11. Observations related to occupations between employers and workers in
Health and social work (NACE N). Both the monthly salary and the hourly
wage tend to be very volatile. The high degree of volatility is likely to
result from changes in the composition of the hours worked (e.g. hours
worked on Sundays are remunerated at a premium) rather than a result
of underlying wage ﬂexibility. This leads to the second largest reduction
in terms of observations (more than 1.3 million, i.e. 6.2%), roughly 70%
of which relating to white-collar employees.
12. Observations maintained with Government-operated postal services. As
with hospital service workers, these occupations are characterised by very
frequent and relatively small wage changes often reverted afterwards (not
necessarily oﬀsetting each other). The high degree of volatility applies
to both the monthly salary and the hourly wage rate. This leads to a
relatively small reduction in the number of observations (216 000 observa-
tions, i.e. less than 1.0% of all observations). Contrary to all other rules,
the majority of observations omitted relate to civil servants (more than
57%).
B.2 Towards the cleaned dataset
Below we list details on the rules that we apply in the baseline dataset in order
to ﬁlter out observations (in case of blue-collar workers) or trajectories (in case
of white-collar workers) that might be contaminated by reporting issues related
to the fact that we do not have information on overtime compensation. Table 17
reports the impact of each step (applied on its own in the baseline dataset) on
the number of observations.
52According to IGSS representatives, lower than hourly minimum wage declarations tend
to result from an implausibly high number of hours worked reported by the employer.40
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1. We remove trajectories (in case of white-collar workers and civil servants)
or observations (in case of blue-collar workers) which do not fulﬁl the
requirements used to identify well-behaved trajectories of hours worked.
In some cases the number of hours worked reported corresponds to the
actual number of hours remunerated, in other cases the number reported
corresponds to the normal number of hours worked in a speciﬁc month
(based on the assumption of eight hours per work day in a given month
or, alternatively, per average work day in the year). In the ﬁrst case, the
number of hours worked may be time-varying, in the two latter cases ﬁrms
report either a constant number of hours worked per month (i.e. 173 for
full-time employees) or a series with all observations taking one of the
following values: 160 (in months with 20 work days), 168 (21 work days),
176 (22 work days) or 184 (23 work days). Depending on the way in which
ﬁrms report the number of hours worked, variation in the number of hours
reported may therefore reﬂect both a change in the number of normal
hours (which should have no impact on the monthly salary or hourly
wage) or the number of overtime hours (possibly aﬀecting the monthly
salary and the hourly wage) or both. For salaried employees (white-collar
workers and civil servants), we allow for the two types of trajectories
of hours reported described above (constant number of hours or a series
featuring the normal hours worked) for both full-time workers and the
most important categories of part-time workers, who work 40%, 50%, 60%,
75%, 80% or 90% of the number of full-time hours.
This measure yields a very substantial reduction in the size of the dataset.
As a result the number of potential and actual wage changes decreases
relative to the baseline dataset by 53% and 66%, respectively.53 Table 17
highlights that the impact on diﬀerent occupational groups is highly asy-
metrical. The lowest relative reduction in the number of potential and
actual wage changes is recorded for civil servants (11% and 12%, respec-
tively) and the highest reduction for blue-collar workers (73% and 83%,
respectively). It reﬂects the fact that public sector companies have the
highest reporting standards and civil servants are the least likely to work
“non-standard” number of hours.
2. We remove trajectories (in case of white-collar workers and civil servants)
or observations (in case of blue-collar workers) consisting of four consecu-
tive wage changes. Given the substantial obstacles with regard to frequent
wage changes typically reported in ﬁrm surveys (see, for example, Druant
et al. (2008)), we consider four consecutive wage changes an indication of
(unreported) changes in the number of hours worked and/or shift assign-
ments. Taken in isolation, this measure would again lead to a substantial
reduction in the number of potential and actual wage changes relative to
the baseline dataset. This applies in particular to the case of blue-collar
workers (−84% of potential wage changes). The corresponding reductions
53The potential number of wage changes (abbreviated as “obs. pot.” in the tables) charac-
terises whether a wage trajectory is continued (i.e. a potential wage change) or interrupted
(i.e. no potential wage change). If and only if the wage trajectory is continued (i.e. a poten-
tial wage change) a distinction is made between an actual wage change or, alternatively, an
unchanged wage. The frequency of wage change is computed as the proportion of actual wage
changes over potential wage changes (see equation (1)).41
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for white-collar employees and civil servants are −40% and −14%, respec-
tively, hence the same assymetry as in the previous step is revealed.
3. We require, for each round of indexation, the minimum wage reported
after indexation to be higher than the minimum wage reported before the
indexation. Wage trajectories not obeying this requirement are removed.54
Admittedly, under the assumption that all wages are integrally indexed,
this might lead to a situation in which wage cuts of more than 2.5% are
dropped. However, we consider the information lost to be outweighed by
the otherwise lower noise in the dataset. On its own, this step would
remove 15% of potential wage changes and 20% of actual wage changs.
The reduction is the largest for white-collar workers and the smallest for
civil servants, hence the same assymetry as in the previous two steps holds.
4. We disregard wage changes which lead to a monthly salary or hourly rate
equivalent to former wage levels within a period shorter than six months.
Such wage change reversals can reﬂect a series of oﬀsetting changes or, al-
ternatively, two wage changes of same magnitude but diﬀerent sign. Wage
changes preceded and followed by observations with the same wage are
considered no-changes.55 In isolation, this measure would reduce the num-
ber of actual wage changes is by 20% relative to the baseline dataset. The
largest reduction is obtained white-collar employees (-24%). In the case
of blue-collar workers and civil servants, the reduction in the number of
potential wage changes is -16% and -11%, respectively.
5. The frequency of wage change should not depend on the size of wage
changes, but from an economic point of view, the role of wage changes may
well depend on their size. Tiny wage changes (less than 1 EUR say in terms
of monthly salary or, alternatively, less than 0.1 percent in terms of the
hourly wage) are probably not evidence of underlying wage ﬂexibility. By
contrast, huge wage changes (say doubling the base wage) tend to be fairly
exceptional and/or suggest poor data quality, in particular when reverted
shortly afterwards. Overall, roughly 26% of all base wage changes (both
upward and downward) are smaller than 1% in absolute terms. Moreover,
we observe a substantial share of fairly sizeable wage changes. More than
3.6% (4.7%) of all wage increases (of all wage cuts) are larger than 25%.
Interestingly, the share of both tiny and huge wage changes is larger for
wage cuts than for wage increases. There is no obvious threshold for wage
changes to be considered "tiny". Figure 5 illustrates the frequency of wage
change as a function of the (lower boundary of the) size of wage change. As
indicated in 4.1.1, for white-collar employees and civil servants the overall
frequency of wage increases is approximately 40% when considering all
wage changes (i.e. with a minimum threshold of 0%). The frequency of
wage increase falls to approximately 20% when ignoring wage increases
of less than 2.5% in relative terms. The upper panel of Figure 5 also
illustrates the overriding role of the automatic wage indexation for wage
adjustments. The frequency of wage increases (but not wage cuts) clearly
reveals a kinked pattern around a wage change of 2.5%, illustrating the
54Note that we do not impose downward nominal rigidity in a strict sense.
55Note that by considering reverting changes a no-change, we reduce the number of observed
wage changes, while leaving the number of potential wage changes unchanged.42
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large number of wage changes due to automatic wage indexation. Tiny
wage changes are probably a poor indication of wage ﬂexibility, probably
reﬂecting marginal regulatory changes, so we decide to consider them a
no-change. Whenever the hourly wage rate (in absolute terms) changes by
less than 0.25% and/or less than 0.075 EUR we consider this a no-change.
Observations implying a reduction of / an increase in the base wage by
more than 25% (in absolute terms) are also omitted in the following.56
The eﬀect of this measure on the number of actual wage changes in the
baseline dataset ranges from a reduction of 21% for blue-collar workers to
5% for civil servants.
6. In addition to disconsidering selected observations (huge wage changes)
and replacing selected others (tiny wage changes or reverting wage changes),
we eliminate wage trajectories characterised by frequent tiny and/or huge
wage changes and by numerous replacements (e.g. due to reversion to
former wage level). This is to avoid an estimate of wage change frequency
primarily based on adjustments/replacements. In order for the entire wage
trajectory to be removed (rather than a single observation from this tra-
jectory), we require the number of adjustments/replacements to represent
more than one half of all observations in the trajectory. The baseline
dataset would be reduced by 32% of actual wage changes and 3% of po-
tential wage changes if only this measure was applied. The impact on
the number of wage changes ranges from −38% for blue-collar workers to
−14% for civil servants.
7. In the case of employees and civil servants, we remove observations that
report a decrease in base wage in December together with a bonus. In
these cases, the base wage in January either continues at its November
level or is increased. In such cases, we omit the December observation
(i.e. split the trajectory). This measure has only a minor impact on the
number of potential and acutal wage changes, reducing their number by
approximately 1% and 2%, respectively, for both white-collar workers and
civil servants.
8. Sometimes wage changes are entirely reversed by the following wage change.
These exact wage reversions are probably associated with misreported
overtime hours, misreported one-oﬀ payments, etc. For this reason, in the
case of white-collar employees and civil servants, we drop all wage trajecto-
ries revealing at least one exact wage reversion (regardless of the duration
after which a wage change is reverted). This measure has signiﬁcant im-
pact on the number of potential and actual wage changes as compared to
the baseline dataset. The percentage of potential wage changes removed
in this step relative to the baseline dataset is 44% and 30% for white-collar
workers and civil servants, respectively.
9. We remove wage trajectories with less than 12 potential wage changes
(i.e. minimum length of 13 months per trajectory). This measure has
56Note that adjusting for tiny wage changes has an impact on the number of observed wage
changes, but not on the number of potential changes. By contrast, the omission of observations
related to huge wage changes aﬀects both the number of observed and of potential wage
changes.43
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only limited impact on the number of potential and actual wage changes,
reducing their number by 4% in both cases.
10. Observations related to occupations between employers and workers within
NACE sector N Health and social work and occupations maintained with
government-operated postal services. Both the monthly salary and the
hourly wage tend to be very volatile. The high degree of volatility is likely
to result from changes in the composition of the hours worked (e.g. hours
worked on Sundays are remunerated at a premium) rather than a result
of underlying wage ﬂexibility. This leads to a reduction in the number of
potential observations and actual wage changes by 8% and 10%, respec-
tively. The impact of this step is the largest for white-collar workers and
civil servants.
B.3 Structure of the dataset
Table 18 outlines the impact of our cleaning procedures on the structure of the
dataset. The number of observations (occupations) fall from 21.7 million in the
raw data to 17.3 million in the baseline dataset and 4.21 million in the cleaned
dataset after adjustment for measurement error. In the process of cleaning we
loose 92.4 % of observations for blue-collar workers, 76.7 % for white-collar work-
ers and 33.3 % for civil servants. As a result, the proportion of civil servants
increases from 7.8 % in the raw dat to 27.1 % in the adjusted dataset. Similarly,
the proportion of public enterprises more than doubles. To maintain representa-
tiveness of our results, we provide weighted results for the whole economy, using
the proportion of each occupational group in the raw data as weights. At the
same time, small ﬁrms are overrepresented in the adjusted dataset, as compared
to the raw data reﬂecting the situation in Luxembourg.44
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C Deﬁntions and notation
C.1 Frequency and size of wage change
The dataset consists of sequences of monthly base wage observations w
ij
t denot-
ing the wage paid to employee i aﬃliated with ﬁrm j in period t.
Equation (1) in Section 3.4.2 deﬁnes the frequency of wage change F
±
ij .I n




































t,t−1 are deﬁned in the main text below equation
(1) as the number of wage observations that remained constant, increased or
decreased between period t − 1 and t.
The average size of a wage increase S
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Admittedly, log diﬀerences may be less intuitive than simple percentage dif-
ferences. In addition, using log diﬀerences may yield a considerable underesti-
mation of wage changes (relative to percentage diﬀerences) in the case of very
sizeable wage changes. However, unlike percentage diﬀerences, log diﬀerences
yield identical wage increases and decreases when wage changes are reversed
reversed. Finally, log diﬀerences are used in order to preserve comparability
with analyses of price behaviour based on micro data.57
To gain an idea about the duration of wage spells, we calculate the aver-
age duration implied by the wage change frequency (implied average duration).
As highlighted by Baudry et al. (2004), by assuming stationarity of and ho-
mogeneity of the data generating process, in a large sample, the inverse of the
57The use of log diﬀerences is pretty much standard in the analysis of price changes based on
micro data, see for example Dhyne et al. (2005). On the importance of price change reversals
in the total frequency of price changes see, for example, Lünnemann and Mathä (2005).45
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frequency of wage change converges asymptotically to the average duration of a
wage spell. In continuous time representation, and assuming a constant proba-
bility of wage change throughout the month, the implied average duration Davg








C.2 Implementation of the break point test
The multiple break point test proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) provides a
least squares estimator of the number of break points (M) and their timing
(T1 to TM) as well as the corresponding wage levels ( ¯ w1 to ¯ wM+1) based on a
recursive algorithm. The test being applied to every single wage trajectory, its
main idea consists in determining each m-partition (i.e. a vector of break dates
T1,...,Tm) by minimising the sum of squared residuals SSR(T1,...,Tm)







[wt − ¯ wk]
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The break-point estimators, thus, are global minimisers of the objective func-
tion and the regression parameters (in our case the constant wage level between
two subsequent break points) are simple least squares estimates applying the
estimated m-partition. While, in principle, the break points can only take a
ﬁnite number of (discrete) values, the computational burden rapidly increases
for more than two break points. Bai and Perron (1998) propose an eﬃcient
algorithm to obtain the global minimisers of the sum of squared residuals using
a dynamic programming algorithm. An important mainstay of this algorithm
is that the global sum of squared residuals for any m-partition (T1,...,Tm)a n d
for any number of breaks is a particular combination of the sum of squared
residuals associated with each of the potential regimes. The aim of this algo-
rithm is to ”compare possible combinations of these sums of squared residuals
(corresponding to diﬀerent m-partitions) to achieve a minimum global sum of
squared residuals” Bai and Perron (2003), i.e. the m-partition (ˆ T1,..., ˆ Tm) with
the estimated break dates.
In the ﬁrst step, the hypothesis of no break in the wage trajectory (i.e. m=0)
is tested against the alternative of one or more breaks on the basis of double
maximum tests (multiple breakpoint test).58 In the second step, and provided
the multiple breakpoint test suggests the presence of one or more breaks, the
supFT(l+1|l) test proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) is used. A model with l+1
breaks is rejected if the overall minimum value of the sum of sqaured residuals
across all segments is suﬃently smaller than the sum of squared residuals from
the model with l breaks. Initially, the entire trajectory of length T is divided
58Contrary to the procedure proposed by Bai and Perron (2003), we use an equal weighted
supF test (UDmax). This is because the weighted supF test (WDmax) frequently led to
econometric issues, in particular in the event of step-like wage trajectories.46
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into two segments. Using an F-test of the sum of squared residuals (with and
without the break), one can test for the presence of a structural break. If the null
of no structural break is rejected, the two segments are retained and a similar
test is applied to each of the resulting two segments. This procedure is continued
(i.e. increasing l) until the test supFT(l+1|l) fails to reject the null hypothesis
of no additional structural change. The ﬁnal number of breaks is therefore equal
to the number of rejections obtained on the basis of the parameter constancy
tests.59
The setup of the breakpoint test in this paper is as follows. We specify
  =0 .05 as the value of the trimming (in percentage) for the critical values used
in the UDmax,t h esupF(l +1 |l) test and the sequential procedure.60 Con-
trary to the direct measures of wage frequency based on the clean and adjusted
dataset, when applying the multiple break point test we require a minimum
length of 36 months for each trajectory (to avoid dealing with discontinuous
wage trajectories) and we remove outliers deﬁned as the upper 2.5 percentile
of the wage change distribution in percent and lower 2.5 percentile of the wage
change distribution in absolute value (eﬀectively removing wage changes smaller
than approximately 0.1 cent). The maximum number of breaks allowed is spec-
iﬁed such that it does not exceed the number of breaks for which asymptotical
critical values are reported by Bai and Perron (1998). In the case of a wage
trajectory prevailing over the entire sample period, the maximum number is
breaks allowed is nine. This upper limit might clearly be too restrictive, in
particular as (genuine) wage changes do also occur for purely institutional rea-
sons.61 In order to reserve the limited number of breakpoints to genuine wage
changes (rather than wasting them on the identiﬁcation of wage indexation and
other obvious institutional wage changes), the breakpoint test is not applied
to the original wage trajectories in the baseline dataset. Rather, the tests are
applied only after adjusting the wage trajectories for changes due to indexation,
the statutory minimum wage and changes in age and marital status the same
way as it is described in Section 3.3 except that in this case the adjustment
procedure is applied directly to the baseline dataset.
59This is as we start with l=0.
60This leads to a minimum length of wage spell of 3 months in the case of a trajectory
prevailing over the entire sample period, i.e. 72 months.
61In particular, the period under study spans six rounds of wage indexations.47
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DT a b l e s
Table 1: Size and frequency of wage changes in the baseline dataset
Frequency of wage Average size of wage
Occup. group change incr. decr. change incr. decr. Obs. pot.
Blue-collars 76.89 42.35 34.53 5.76 5.69 5.86 6 828 003
White-collars 41.83 26.36 15.47 7.83 7.03 9.21 8 276 087
Civil servants 29.37 23.99 5.38 4.69 3.81 8.60 1 651 225
All 57.31 33.68 23.63 6.62 6.15 7.59 16 755 315
Note: “Obs. pot.” refers to potential wage changes, i.e. the denominator of equation (1). Results
for “All” are weighted by the proportion of observations per occupational group in the raw data,
see Table 18.
Table 2: Frequency and size of wage changes in the cleaned dataset
Frequency of wage Average size of wage
Occup. group change incr. decr. change incr. decr. Obs. pot.
Blue-collars 12.80 12.44 0.35 3.04 2.93 7.02 678 042
White-collars 14.82 13.87 0.95 3.61 3.47 5.63 2 211 758
Civil servants 20.65 20.25 0.40 2.54 2.47 6.16 1 107 264
All 14.33 13.70 0.63 3.26 3.14 6.32 3 997 064
Note: See Table 1.48
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Table 3: The eﬀect of indexation, minimum wage, age and marital status on
the frequency and size of wage changes
Frequency of wage Average size of wage
Occup. group change incr. decr. change incr. decr. Obs. pot.
I. Indexation
Blue-collars 5.69 4.86 0.83 3.51 3.49 3.69 678 042
White-collars 8.31 6.22 2.09 4.16 4.58 2.91 2 211 758
Civil servants 13.00 12.55 0.44 2.46 2.34 5.84 1 107 264
All 7.45 6.08 1.37 3.72 3.89 3.50 3 997 064
II. Minimum wage
Blue-collars 12.36 12.00 0.35 3.04 2.92 7.02 678 042
White-collars 14.80 13.85 0.95 3.61 3.47 5.63 2 211 758
Civil servants 20.65 20.25 0.40 2.54 2.47 6.16 1 107 264
All 14.11 13.48 0.63 3.26 3.14 6.32 3 997 064
III. Age and marital status
Blue-collars 12.56 12.21 0.36 3.05 2.93 7.02 676 215
White-collars 14.64 13.68 0.95 3.61 3.47 5.63 2 206 949
Civil servants 19.29 18.89 0.40 2.49 2.41 6.16 1 088 616
All 14.03 13.40 0.63 3.26 3.14 6.32 3 971 780
Note: The numbers are relative to the sample adjusted for measurement error. “Obs. pot.” refers
to potential wage changes, i.e. the denominator of equation (1). Results for “All” are weighted by
the proportion of observations per occupational group in the raw data, see Table 18.
Table 4: The impact of all adjustments on the frequency and size of wage
changes
Frequency of wage Average size of wage
Occup. group change incr. decr. change incr. decr. Obs. pot.
Blue-collars 5.10 4.26 0.83 3.58 3.56 3.69 676 927
White-collars 8.16 6.07 2.09 4.17 4.60 2.91 2 208 637
Civil servants 12.04 11.59 0.448 2.39 2.26 5.84 1 095 228
All 7.02 5.65 1.37 3.752 3.93 3.50 3 980 792
Notes: “Obs. pot.” refers to potential wage changes, i.e. the denominator of equation (1). Results
for “All” are weighted by the proportion of observations per occupational group in the raw data,
see Table 18.49
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Table 5: The branches of the economy and the frequency and size of wage
changes
Frequency of wage Average size of wage
Branch change incr. decr. change incr. decr. Obs. pot.
I. Adjusted dataset
A+B 3.90 2.87 1.03 4.59 4.86 3.82 17 084
C 3.99 3.43 0.56 4.16 4.40 3.02 2 408
D 4.85 3.67 1.18 4.04 4.31 3.23 235 967
E 10.53 9.21 1.32 3.04 2.42 5.02 14 468
F 4.43 3.51 0.91 4.53 4.45 5.12 252 597
G 5.02 3.66 1.36 4.42 5.09 2.80 459 620
H 3.61 2.28 1.34 4.86 6.57 2.07 143 235
I 6.61 5.43 1.18 3.95 4.23 3.13 354 476
J 10.55 7.35 3.20 3.87 4.15 3.27 555 828
K 5.46 3.99 1.47 4.44 5.03 2.94 619 766
L 11.90 11.46 0.42 .40 2.25 6.43 1 182 601
M 8.26 6.60 1.66 5.05 4.72 6.32 21 419
O 5.82 4.80 1.02 4.41 4.54 3.74 121 323
II. Cleaned dataset
A+B 10.46 10.20 0.27 3.40 3.27 8.81 17 087
C 12.11 11.65 0.47 3.11 3.09 3.86 2 408
D 12.12 11.56 0.56 3.20 3.09 5.88 236 006
E 18.05 16.90 1.16 2.88 2.55 5.20 14 498
F 11.73 11.26 0.48 3.39 3.19 8.07 252 624
G 11.97 11.48 0.49 3.49 3.39 5.99 459 663
H 10.97 10.63 0.34 3.51 3.41 6.98 143 245
I 13.73 13.25 0.48 3.23 3.14 5.49 356 625
J 17.26 15.52 1.74 3.52 3.29 5.61 557 471
K 12.53 11.96 0.57 3.57 3.48 5.78 619 892
L 20.48 20.10 0.38 2.55 2.46 6.94 1 194 738
M 15.70 14.50 1.19 3.92 3.57 8.16 21 436
O 13.19 12.65 0.54 3.40 3.31 5.79 121 371
Note: Results are weighted by occupational group (using the proportion of observations per
occupational group in each branch in the raw data). Branches are deﬁned as A: Agriculture,
hunting and forestry; B: Fishing; C: Mining and quarrying; D: Manufacturing; E: Electricity, gas
and water supply; F: Construction; G: Wholesale and retail trade; H: Hotels and restaurants; I:
Transport, storage and communication; J: Financial intermediation; K: Real estate, renting and
business activities; L: Public administration and defence; compulsory social security; M: Education;
O: Other community, social and personal service activities.50
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Table 6: The size of enterprises and the frequency and size of wage changes
Frequency of wage Average size of wage
Size category change incr. decr. change incr. decr. Obs. pot.
0 − 14 empl. 4.25 3.12 1.12 4.92 5.65 2.95 898 538
15 − 149 empl. 6.37 4.68 1.74 .19 4.55 3.36 1 077 492
≥ 150 empl. 10.28 .92 1.30 2.90 2.86 4.02 2 004 762
Note: Size refers to the average number of employees over the sample period. Results are based on
the adjusted dataset and are weighted by occupational group (using the proportion of observations
per occupational group in each size category in the raw data).
Table 7: Public and private enterprises
Frequency of wage Average size of wage
Occup. group change incr. decr. change incr. decr. Obs. pot.
(1) Private enterprises
Blue-collars 3.86 2.97 0.88 4.36 4.64 3.42 579 922
White-collars 7.69 5.46 2.23 4.40 5.06 2.76 2 001 276
(2) Public enterprises
Blue-collars 12.52 11.99 0.53 2.14 1.95 6.30 97 005
White-collars 12.62 11.90 0.72 2.82 2.54 7.38 207 361
Civil servants 12.04 11.59 0.45 2.39 2.26 5.84 1 095 228
Note: Results are based on the adjusted dataset.
Table 8: Composition of observations per period (cleaned dataset)
Changes in a typical
year month Frequency of wage
Period Number Pct. Number increase constant decrease
Indexation 54 542 48.6 54 542 98.23 1.19 0.58
January 30 656 27.3 30 656 52.53 45.89 1.59
Other 27 121 24.1 2 712 4.18 95.19 0.63
Note: Results are not weighted. The dataset is adjusted for measurement error but not for
indexation, minimum wage etc. Wages are considered to be constant if its log change lies between
-0.1 and 0.1.51
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Table 9: Frequency and size of wage changes by period, adjusted dataset
Frequency of wage Average size of wage
Period change incr. decr. change incr. decr. Obs. pot.
(1) Blue-collar
Indexation 10.78 4.43 6.35 2.16 2.97 1.59 55 144
January 24.14 23.33 0.81 2.50 2.32 7.56 47 154
Other 2.99 2.68 0.30 4.79 4.53 7.04 574 629
(2) White-collar
Indexation 19.75 5.21 14.54 2.07 5.20 0.95 182 676
January 38.40 35.99 2.41 3.23 3.15 4.38 156 740
Other 4.49 3.64 0.85 5.74 5.72 5.85 1 869 221
(3) Civil servants
Indexation 7.15 6.38 0.78 4.65 4.70 4.26 91 700
January 98.58 98.17 0.41 1.53 1.52 3.45 78 837
Other 5.15 4.73 0.42 3.50 3.24 6.34 924 691
(4) Total
Indexation 14.54 .93 9.61 2.31 4.11 1.51 329 520
January 36.63 35.11 1.52 2.75 2.64 5.77 282 731
Other 3.84 3.28 0.56 5.12 4.97 6.45 3 368 541
Note: Results for “Total” are weighted by occupational groups (the proportion of observations in
each occupational group and period in the raw dataset). The results are based on the adjusted
dataset, hence a wage decrease in the indexation period has to be interpreted as a wage change
lower than 2.5% in unadjusted terms.
Table 10: Percentage of year-on-year observations
Raw data Baseline data Cleaned data
Category Decreased Constant Decreased Constant Decreased Constant
Blue-collars 16.00 3.63 16.96 2.36 0.57 7.56
White-collars 11.56 3.65 11.00 3.55 1.10 5.70
Civil servants 3.60 0.17 3.54 0.17 0.52 0.08
Total 12.66 3.29 12.48 2.70 0.84 4.26
Note: Results for “Total” are not weighted.52
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Table 11: The frequency of wage change based on the break test
Frequency of wage
Occup. group change increase decrease change augm. Obs. pot.
Blue-collars 3.51 2.68 0.83 6.00 4 372 688
White-collars 5.42 4.54 0.88 10.79 4 714 499
Civil servants 8.70 8.45 0.25 17.35 1 402 423
All 4.78 3.97 0.81 9.05 10 489 610
Note: The break test procedure of Bai and Perron (1998) is run on the baseline dataset. “Obs.
pot.” refers to potential wage changes, i.e. the denominator of equation (1). The augmented
frequency of wage change includes wage changes due to indexation, minimum wage changes,
changes in age and marital status. Results for “All” are weighted by the proportion of observations
per occupational group in the raw data, see Table 18.
Table 12: The frequency of wage change based on the break test for NACE1
branches
Frequency of wage
Branch change increase decrease change augm. Obs. pot.
A+B 3.74 2.35 1.39 7.60 37 116
C 3.19 2.59 0.61 5.83 15 539
D 3.68 2.98 0.70 5.70 1 542 650
E 6.03 5.59 0.44 10.70 47 497
F 3.52 2.49 1.04 6.40 1 214 075
G 3.85 3.01 0.83 7.61 1 194 241
H 3.29 2.53 0.76 7.42 276 815
I 4.96 4.32 0.64 9.91 1 040 356
J 5.95 4.93 1.02 11.94 1 405 753
K 4.49 3.51 0.98 9.60 1 062 506
L 7.92 7.41 0.51 15.94 1 686 936
M 6.55 5.63 0.92 12.74 45 670
N 4.85 4.30 0.55 8.67 674 624
O 4.24 3.64 0.60 9.00 245 832
Note: Results are based on the break test procedure of Bai and Perron (1998) and are weighted by
occupational group (using the proportion of observations per occupational group in each branch
in the raw data). Branches follow NACE1 deﬁnitions, see note under Table 5. “Obs. pot.” refers
to potential wage changes, i.e. the denominator of equation (1). The augmented frequency of
wage change includes wage changes due to indexation, minimum wage changes, changes in age and
marital status. Results for “All” are weighted by the proportion of observations per occupational
group in the raw data, see Table 18.53
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Table 13: The size of enterprises, results based on the break test
Frequency of wage
Size category change increase decrease Obs. pot.
0 − 14 empl. 3.78 2.92 0.86 1 451 363
15 − 149 empl. 4.41 3.51 0.90 3 321 422
≥ 150 empl. 5.39 4.67 0.72 5 716 825
Note: Size refers to the average number of employees over the sample period. Results are based on
the break test procedure of Bai and Perron (1998) and are weighted by occupational group (using
the proportion of observations per occupational group in each size category in the raw data).
Table 14: Public and private enterprises, results based on the break test
Frequency of wage
Occup. group change increase decrease Obs. pot.
(1) Private enterprises
Blue-collars 3.28 2.48 0.80 3 913 619
White-collars 5.20 4.29 0.91 4 318 743
(2) Public enterprises
Blue-collars 5.43 4.40 1.03 459 069
White-collars 7.87 7.27 0.60 395 756
Civil servants 8.70 8.45 0.25 1 402 423
Note: Results are based on the break test procedure of Bai and Perron (1998).
Table 15: Frequency of wage changes by period, results based on the break test
Frequency of wage
Period change increase decrease Obs. pot.
Indexation 6.12 3.14 2.98 764 530
January 20.66 19.83 0.83 796 982
Other 3.27 2.65 0.62 8 928 098
Note: Results for “Total” are weighted by occupational groups (the proportion of observations in
each occupational group and period in the original dataset).54
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Table 16: From raw to the baseline dataset, lost observations
Blue-collar White-collar Civil servants
Step Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct. Obs. Pct.
Total 10 185 734 9 811 394 1 699 546
1 - 800 251 −7.86 - 67 676 −0.69 - 326 −0.02
2 - 22 095 −0.22 - 3 168 −0.03 - 216 −0.01
3 - 410 685 −4.03 - 215 275 −2.19 - 5 037 −0.30
4 - 539 147 −5.29 - 245 968 −2.51 - 3 687 −0.22
5 -1 340 576 −13.16 - 230 519 −2.35 - 1 894 −0.11
6 - 62 779 −0.62 - 34 349 −0.35 - 4 190 −0.25
7 - 961 987 −9.44 - 200 786 −2.05 - 3 220 −0.19
8 - 407 288 −4.00 - 166 301 −1.69 - 1 027 −0.06
9 - 613 146 −6.02 - 6 050 −0.06 0.00
10 - 580 405 −5.70 - 469 434 −4.78 - 262 −0.02
11 - 389 561 −3.82 - 941 751 −9.60 - 10 913 −0.64
12 - 54 084 −0.53 - 34 294 −0.35 - 117 299 −6.90
Note: All lost observations are relative to the initial number of observations (‘Total’) in the raw
dataset. The steps are described in detail in Appendix B.1.
Table 17: Lost observations in the cleaning procedure
Blue-collar White-collar Civil servants
Step Obs. pot. Wage chg. Obs. pot. Wage chg. Obs. pot. Wage chg.
Baseline 6 828 003 5 249 780 8 276 087 3 461 814 1 651 225 485 041
1 -62.2% -72.0% -53.7% -63.3% -10.7% -11.6%
2 -83.3% -94.2% -39.6% -70.2% -14.0% -32.1%
3 -20.4% -22.5% -13.0% -17.8% -4.8% -7.6%
4 0.0% -23.8% 0.0% -15.9% 0.0% -10.8%
5 -2.3% -20.8% -1.7% -12.8% -0.7% -5.2%
6 -4.8% -37.5% -2.8% -27.2% -0.7% -13.7%
7 n/a n/a -0.7% -1.6% -0.5% -1.7%
8 n/a n/a -43.5% -48.9% -30.1% -41.7%
9 -5.0% -4.5% -3.9% -3.8% -0.5% -0.3%
10 -5.0% -4.7% -10.3% -16.3% -7.6% -15.6%
Note: All lost observations (wage changes) are relative to the number of observations (wage
changes) in the baseline dataset. The steps are described in detail in Appendix B.2. “Obs. pot.”
refers to potential wage changes, i.e. the denominator of equation (1). “Wage chg.” is the number
of wage changes, i.e. the numerator of equation (1).55
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E Figures
Figure 1: Frequency of wage change by month











Multiple breakpoint test Frequency of wage increase
Frequency of wage cut
Note: The ﬁrst and last two months are omitted because they are not considered
a potential break date in the break test. Spikes correspond to the months of
January and to months coinciding with wage indexation.






























































Log−change in hourly base wage
Remaining periods
Note: Graphs are based on the adjusted dataset. Hence, the spike at zero in the “Wage
indexation” panel would appear as an identical spike at 2.5% in the unadjusted dataset.57
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Figure 3: Frequency of wage change by ﬁrm (2001-2006)


























































































































Figure 4: Number of ﬁrms and employees and wage bill by sector


















































Note: “AB” to “Q” refer to NACE1 sectors. For deﬁnition, see the note below
Table 5.58
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Figure 6: Number of ﬁrms and employees and wage bill by sector in the cleaned
dataset
















































Note: “AB” to “Q” refer to NACE1 sectors. For deﬁnition, see the note below
Table 5.
Figure 5: Frequency of base wage changes as a function of their size (2001-2006)
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